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ABSTRACT
This Article develops a framework for effective leniency
policy design in jurisdictions that have limited or no mileage
enforcing antitrust laws. Through an extensive review of legal
and economic studies of leniency and comparative analysis, the
Article identifies hurdles common to young systems that may be
tackled with analogous solutions. Some issues simply require a
methodological enforcement strategy and time. Others, however,
call for a readjustment of either the leniency programs or the
antitrust systems they help to enforce. While the latter approach
is preferable, it is more difficult to implement. This Article focuses
on leniency and recommends three general strategies:rethinking
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the magnitude of the reward where penalties for collusion are
modest, reducing discretion to enhance transparency and
predictability in the pre-enforcement experience phase, and
ensuring a balance between the adequate protection of
confidentiality and the need to foster internationalcooperation
efforts to dismantle cartels. These proposals aim to contribute to
enhancing the efficiency of new systems and to fostering a
"glocalized"deterrent effect that is paramount to combatting the
biggest and most harmful collusive practices.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) introduced a new
method to detect cartels known as the Corporate Leniency Policy. The
rationale behind the system, also referred to as an amnesty or
immunity program, 1 was rather straightforward: the DOJ would vow
not to punish a company involved in an illegal cartel in exchange for a
confession and cooperation that would enable the indictment of other
cartel members. Although the policy was largely unused in its original
formulation, it planted the seed of what would arguably become the
most influential leniency program in the world. The current policy, the
result of a revision that took place in the 1990s, has helped enforcers
obtain evidence against a myriad of cartels and has inspired multiple
other countries to follow suit. To date, leniency has brought down
collusive practices in over fifty jurisdictions, including the United
States, Canada, and the European Union. 2 Leniency has even made it
to Hollywood. The movie, The Informant! (2009), directed by Steven
Soderbergh, stars Matt Damon as Mark Whitacre, an employee at
Archer Daniels-Midland (ADM) who worked undercover for the FBI for
three years and helped expose a major price-fixing conspiracy in the
lysine industry.3
In the secret recordings of the conversations inside ADM, the

See, e.g., ELEANOR Fox & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND
1.
COMPETITION LAW 30 (2010) (providing that 'amnesty' and 'immunity' refer to complete
protection from the penalties that would otherwise have been imposed on the company.
The former is more frequently used in the United States, and the latter in the European
Union).
2.
Scott D. Hammond, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over
the Last Two Decades, in ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST
AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 1, at 75.
THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009).
3.
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"

president is infamously heard talking about the company's motto: "Our
competitors are our friends. Our customers are the enemy." 4 Cartelsunderstood broadly as arrangements between competitors "designed to
eliminate competition" 5-are widely considered to be the "supreme evil
of antitrust."6 If successful, the total profits of cartel members ought to
be higher than the sum of individual profits in a competitive market, 7
and yet there is neither an increase in efficiency nor an increase in the
quality of the products. 8 The result of this is that collusive practices
inflict "considerable damage on the economy." 9 The fight against
cartels is hampered by how difficult they are to detect. Since they are
both highly lucrative and systematically illegal in most jurisdictions,
cartel members, eager to see their profits rise while avoiding the legal
consequences of their actions, have been known to go to great lengths
to hide their behavior from the eye of the enforcer.' 0 The secrecy of
cartels means it is also rare for the parties affected by the conduct to
be in possession of the proof needed to start proceedings in order to
bring the infringement to an end or to claim compensation. Final
consumers too-often indirect purchasers of the cartelists-are
unlikely to even be aware that they have been harmed.
Unsurprisingly, the few studies that have been conducted on the
detection rate of cartels paint a bleak picture when it comes to the
chances of busting collusion. 12

4.
Scott D. Hammond, Caught in the Act: Inside an International Cartel,
JUSTICE NEWS (Oct. 18, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/caught-act-insideinternational-cartel [https://perma.cc/RLR9-E8AK] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
5.
DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN H. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 152 (1995).
6.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407-08 (2004).
7.
See COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK 145-49 (Sandra Marco Colino, ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. 2011).
8.
Mario Monti, Member of the European Commission in charge of Competition,
SPEECH/00/295: Fighting Cartels: Why and How?, Third Nordic Competition Policy
Conference,
(Sept. 11,
2000),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-00295_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6SNM-4C8D] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
9.
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Strengthens the Fight
Against the Cartels (Dec. 3, 1998), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-981060_en.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3PT-UFXN] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
10.
See Press Release, European Commission, Tackling Cartels: A Never-Ending
Task (Oct. 8, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-09-454_en.htm?locale=en
[https://perma.cc/5Y23-RLJ3] (archived Feb. 5, 2017) (explaining that in order to hide their
behaviour, cartelists use "encrypted e-mail, attributing code names, using fake or
misleading e-mail accounts, pre-paid mobile phones," according to former E.U.
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes).
11.
Katalin J. Cseres & Joanna Mendes, Consumers'Access to EU Competition
Law Procedures:Outer and Inner Limits, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 2, 497 (2013).
12.
See generally Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The
Probabilityof Getting Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 3, 535 (1991); Emmanuel Combe
et al., Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union 22 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1015061
[https://perma.cc/9L7M-564Z] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
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The low detection probability, coupled with the high profits that
may be obtained through collusion, make it very difficult for
competition law to deter companies from engaging in such conduct.
Intuitively, it would appear that a solution that employs techniques
that bring down cartels from inside, by breaking the trust among their
members, should do the trick. The value of leniency resides precisely
in that it helps to solve what Patrick Rey has described as an
information acquisition problem faced by competition agencies: "firms
know whether they collude; the agencies do not."' 3 The proliferation of
effective leniency regimes has been deemed the single most significant
development in cartel enforcement. 14 However, there is one important
caveat: not any leniency program will enhance cartel exposure; only an
effective policy will achieve that result. A poorly designed leniency
program might even have adverse effects, as colluding firms could work
out ways to use the system to their advantage.15
The abundant literature on leniency tends to focus on experienced
antitrust jurisdictions, particularly the United States and the
European Union. To date, little attention has been paid to the merits
of amnesty programs in competition law regimes that are only just
taking off, which is surprising given that about two-thirds of
competition laws around the world are under twenty-five years old.' 6
The present Article attempts to fill this gap by focusing on the
prospective effectiveness of leniency programs in young antitrust
jurisdictions that have limited or no experience enforcing competition
law or amnesty policies. Young jurisdictions treat leniency as part of
the "antitrust package." While it took the United States over a century
and the European Union more than four decades to adopt operational
leniency programs, younger jurisdictions tend to introduce leniency
policies within fifteen years of the implementation of their antitrust
laws,' 7 oftentimes much earlier.' 8 The rush to embrace leniency is a

13.
EUROPEAN

Patrick Rey, On the Use of Economic Analysis in Cartel Detection, in
COMPETITION LAw ANNUAL

2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION

OF

CARTELS 81 (Claus-Dieter Ehlerman & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007).
Fox & CRANE, supra note 1, at 75.
14.
Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan R. Soetevent, Laboratory Evidence on the
15.
Effectiveness of CorporateLeniency Programs, 39 RAND J. OF ECON. 607, 608 (2008).
ARMANDO E. RODRIGUEZ & ASHOK MENON, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION
16.
POLICY: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ANTITRUST IN DEVELOPING AND REFORMING ECONOMIES

21 (2010).
17.
See, e.g., Albanian Competition Law on Competition Protection, Law No.
9121 (2003) (Alb.), http://www.caa.gov.alluploads/laws/FineLeniency.Programme.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8ZR-EK79] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
For example, Article 46 of China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), in force since
18.
2007, refers to the possibility of exempting from or mitigating punishment in exchange
for self-reporting. Since then, further leniency provisions were promulgated in various
sets of rules, and a new comprehensive draft leniency policy was announced in early
2016. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa (cPAAkAfPIff
M) [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007), art. 46, http://www.china.org.cn/government/
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testament to its efficacy in the established jurisdictions, on which
antitrust legislation is largely modelled. However, "on the shelf'
competition law is not prit-ti-porter;it needs to be tailored to factor in
the environment in which the law is to be applied. While there are
striking similarities in the fundamental principles of modern
competition law regimes, context is paramount both when legislating
and when enforcing the law. 19 Overlooking the peculiarities of the
region in which the legislation is to be applied can easily jeopardize the
success and adequacy of any antitrust regulatory attempt, and this
extends to the adoption of rigorous leniency programs.
The principal aim of this Article, therefore, is to develop a
framework for effective leniency policy design in jurisdictions with
limited antitrust experience. This framework is based on the
fundamental principles laid down in theoretical, empirical, and
experimental studies of leniency carried out by legal and economic
scholars, as well as on the experience of established leniency programs.
At the same time, the Article will endeavor to apply this framework to
settings in which a competition culture is only just starting to bud. Any
attempt to put forward normative and legislative suggestions for the
sound development of leniency in young jurisdictions is complicated by
the sheer volume and diversity of new regimes. However, an
examination of the law and policy developments in these jurisdictions
reveals common challenges that can be tackled with analogous
solutions. Some issues ought to be addressed through the learning
process and the accumulation of experience, and require a
methodological enforcement strategy and time. Others, however,
might need the readjustment of the leniency programs or the antitrust
systems they help to enforce. The Article thus focuses on leniency
design and identifies three specific challenges affecting the leniency
programs of young antitrust jurisdictions that deserve particular
attention: first, determining the magnitude of the reward that will
entice self-reporting in jurisdictions that only contemplate relatively
modest punishment for collusion; second, drafting policy on the part of
antitrust agencies that will achieve transparency and predictability,
which is particularly difficult where there is no enforcement
experience; and third, attaining a sufficient degree of confidentiality to
make leniency enticing without hampering international cooperation
efforts to break cartels.
The usefulness of each new leniency program resides not just in
its fundamental role in enhancing regional prosperity through the

laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm [https://perma.cc/D8WF-F9WY] (archived Mar.
28, 2017)
19.
Eleanor Fox & Michal Gal, Drafting Competition Law for Developing
Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience 9, (New York Univ. Law & Econ. Working
Papers, Paper No. 374, 2014), http://1sr.nellco.org/nyu-lewp/374 [https://perma.cc/C2AHPJLA] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
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protection of competition in local markets; given the prominent
absence of global antitrust rules, increasingly "glocalized" efforts to
tackle cartels can also create an invaluable joint deterrent effect that
is paramount to combatting the biggest and most harmful collusive
practices in the world. In order to address these issues, the Article
relies principally on comparative theoretical and practical research,
with some elements of interdisciplinary analysis, as it draws on the
principal legal and economic studies of leniency. Accordingly, the
Article is structured into five main parts: Part II provides the
theoretical framework necessary to assess leniency programs and lays
down the parameters by which to evaluate policy design. Part III
covers the practical experience of leniency by examining the evolution
of such programs in the United States and the European Union. Part
IV focuses on the implementation of leniency programs in young
jurisdictions and examines the recent adoption of leniency in Hong
Kong to illustrate the principal issues that emerge when using leniency
without antitrust enforcement experience. Part V assesses the
challenges of leniency in new jurisdictions, as evidenced through the
analysis carried out in previous Parts, and offers suggestions as to how
to tackle these issues. Part VI concludes.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE ROLE OF LENIENCY IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST CARTELS
A. The Origins and Rationale of Leniency Policies
Leniency is defined in the New Oxford Dictionary as "[tihe fact or
quality of being more merciful or tolerant than expected." 20 Consistent
with this definition, in the context of competition law, leniency is a
policy by which cartel participants are offered some kind of rewardusually immunity or a partial reduction in the penalty or penalties
they would normally face for partaking in collusion-in exchange for
the voluntary disclosure of information that serves as evidence of the
22
existence of the cartel. 21 It is a tool for detecting cartel activity that
involves "breaking down adversary coalitions by playing members
against each other."2 3 Such tactics have been described as the "most

Leniency, NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
20.
leniency (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/R5LV-JFAF] (archived Mar. 28,
2017).
In some cases, positive rewards are also granted. See infra subsection II.C.2.
21.
Martin Duch, The Impact of Leniency Program on Cartel Enforcement 6
22.
Thesis, Tilburg School of Law),
(unpublished L.L.M.
(June 6, 2015)
http://www.nathanhmiller.org/miller-cartels-aer.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTY7-4HRK
(archived Feb. 25, 2017).
23.
Giancarlo Spagnolo, Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs2 (Ctr. for
Econ. & Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4840, 2005), ftp://ftp.zew.delpub/zew-docs/
[https://perma.cc/6KQJ-PJUV]
veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/GiancarloSpagnolo.pdf
(archived Feb. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Spagnolo, Divide et Impera].
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effective and least costly mechanism for detecting and prosecuting
activity that is systematic, deliberate and covert," 24 and they are
certainly not new or exclusive to competition law.
It is possible to find multiple historical references to the possibility
of escaping the most severe forms of punishment in exchange for some
form of cooperative action. Jostein Gaarder's novel, Sophie's World,
describes the sentencing of Socrates to death in 399 B.C. in Ancient
Greece for the crimes of introducing new gods and corrupting the
youth: "He could very likely have appealed for leniency. At least he
could have saved his life by agreeing to leave Athens. But had he done
this he would not have been Socrates." 25 In this case, the celebrated
philosopher was not required to incriminate anyone else to escape
capital punishment, but modern leniency systems usually involve
affording a beneficial treatment to whistleblowers who, having
breached the law., come forward and provide proof that helps the
authorities take action against other wrongdoers. This is precisely how
the evidence that exposed the infamous corruption scandal in the
F6d6ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the
governing body of football, was obtained. The informant, Chuck Blazer,
was a former FIFA 'executive committee member who had accepted
bribes and been involved in money laundering and tax evasion. Blazer
avoided a seventy-five-year prison sentence by confessing, and by
agreeing to "provide truthful, complete and accurate information" to
U.S. prosecutors and to "participate in undercover activities pursuant
to the specific instructions of law enforcement agents." 26
Hypothetically, leniency helps destabilize cartels.27 References
abound in the literature to the prisoner's dilemma as an illustration of
how leniency threatens cartel stability.28 Collusion is a joint activity,

24.
Caron Beaton-Wells, Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion?, in ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION 4 (Caron BeatonWells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
25.

JOSTEIN GAARDER,

SOPHIE'S WORLD: A NOVEL ABOUT THE HISTORY OF

PHILOSOPHY 63 (Paulette Meller trans., Berkley Books 1994).
26.
The case was widely covered in the mainstream media. See, e.g., Rupert
Neate, Chuck Blazer agreed to go undercover to avoid potential 75-year sentence,
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/15/chuckblazer-fifa-ban-undercover-back-taxes-plea-deal [https://perma.cc/Q4YK-NVPU] (archived
Feb. 6, 2017). In the United States, the use of plea bargaining and leniency in criminal
cases such as the FIFA scandal has been subject to strong criticism. See, e.g., Timothy
Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining,26 REG. 3, 24 (2003).
27.
Gary R. Spratling & D. Jarrett Arp, The International Leniency Revolution:
The Transformation of International Cartel Enforcement During The First Ten Years Of
The United States' 1993 Corporate Amnesty/Immunity Policy, Address at the American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law's Annual Meeting (Aug. 12, 2003),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Spratling-Arp%20ABA2003_Paper
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7ST-9QNL] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
28.
See, e.g., Constanza Nicolosi, No Good Whistle Goes Unpunished: Can We
Protect EuropeanAntitrust Leniency Applications from Discovery?, 31 Nw. J. OF INT'L L.
& BUS. 225, 4 (2011); Andreas Stephan & Ali Nikpay, Leniency Theory and Complex
Realities 11 (Center for Competition Policy, Working Paper 14-8, 2015),
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but each cartel member will evaluate the strategy that is most
profitable to them individually. As explained above, 29 colluding instead
of competing can lead to a considerable increase in revenues, but the
high return rate of cartels may be threatened by the conduct of other
members. If members do not observe the arrangement and decide to
cheat, the cheating firms will see a steeper surge in profits, at the
expense of those in the cartel who are not cheating.3 0 Moreover, if a
cartelist blows the whistle and applies for leniency, furnishing the
authorities with evidence of the collusion, the companies who have not
come forward will likely face penalties for their unlawful conduct
which, if sufficiently stiff, would at least disgorge any profits obtained
through the cartel. Firms are thus "collectively better off not to selfreport but each firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate." 3 1 As a
consequence, they need to "make repeated [individual] judgments as to
the profitability of staying in a cartel agreement as against either.
cheating on the agreement or approaching the competition
authority." 32
Collusion, therefore, is only worthwhile provided that no member
cheats or applies for leniency. But, whereas the risk of cheating can be
minimized by establishing ways to monitor compliance within the
cartel arrangement, ensuring that no one reports to the authorities is
more difficult to control. Since full immunity will only typically be
granted to the first to come forward, potential applicants will not
inform other cartel members of their intention to blow the whistle, so
as to ensure they get to the agency before anyone else. This race to be
the first informant has a substantial impact on the trust between cartel
members.3 3 In principle, it seems logical that they would be tempted to
seek leniency if the risk of the cartel being detected and punished is
higher than the possibility of increasing profits by colluding. 34 But
risk-benefit analyses in this area are far from straightforward, and it

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstractid=2537470 [https:/Iperma.cc/EW4XEATF] (archived Feb. 25, 2017); Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Impact of
the CorporateLeniency Programon Cartel Formationand the Cartel PricePath 15 (Ctr.
for Int'l Research on the Japanese Econ., Working Paper F-358, 2005),
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf358.pdf [https://perma.c/2ZPBKFCZ] (archived Feb. 25, 2017).
See supraPart I.
29.
Stigler's seminal work on the instability of cartels is still the point of
30.
reference in this field. See generally George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. OF
POL. ECON. 44, 49-58 (1964) (providing results that show that the greater the number of
firms in the cartel, the greater is the likelihood of cheating being able to go undetected.
Nonetheless, if firms are able to pool their information the probability of detection of any
cheating rises dramatically).
Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and
31.
InternationalAntitrust Cooperation, 30 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 528, 529 (2012).
Stephan & Nikpay, supranote 28, at 3.
32.
See id.; see also Nicolosi supranote 28, at 230.
33.
Goneng Giirkaynak et al., Granting Immunity and Revoking Immunity: A
34.
Global Overview of Leniency Programmes,INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. R. 195 (2014).
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would be virtually impossible for a company to work out the most
probable outcome with any degree of certainty. What is clear, however,
is that leniency makes the profitability of cartels much less evident, as
it creates an "asymmetry of costs" by granting immunity and
reductions in the penalties to some cartelists, while stringently
punishing others. 35 In this prisoner's dilemma, the risk of being
discovered and punished is "unequally distributed," and the moment
one firm blows the whistle, the rest have almost "100% certainty of
being detected and having to pay a hefty fine." 36 Whether this carteldestabilizing premise holds true in practice will be explored in detail
in the remainder of this Part.
B. Measuring the Success of Leniency Policies:A Review of the
Academic Literature
"Leniencyprograms have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the
hands of antitrustenforcers against the most damagingforms of
explicit collusion among rival firms.37
Before delving into the analysis of the characteristics of specific
leniency programs, it is necessary to define the parameters on which
to assess whether the policy has truly become-borrowing from JoanRam6n Borrell-a "weapon of mass dissuasion."3 8 As evidenced by the
above analysis, the logic behind the introduction of leniency is
premised on the hypothetical potential to break the trust between
cartelists and to obfuscate calculations of the gains that might be
attained through collusion. In practice, however, quantifying the
success of leniency is much more complex, not least because deciding
how best to measure its effectiveness can be somewhat ambiguous.
Enforcers and scholars often refer to the number of cartels that have
been cracked or the millions of dollars that companies have been fined
as the principal sign of success.39 Scott Hammond, for instance, has

35.
See generally Evgenia Motchenkova & Rob van der Laan, Strictness of
Leniency Programs and Asymmetric Punishment Effect, 58 INT'L R. OF ECON. 401, 402
(2011) (explaining the issue of the asymmetric punishment of leniency).
36.
Hans Vedder, The Kone Case and the Lifts Cartel - An Upward Effect on
Prices and
Effectiveness?,
EUROPEAN
LAW
BLOG
(June
19,
2014),
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2014/06/19/the-kone-case-and-the-lifts-cartel-an-upward-effecton-prices-and-effectiveness/ [https://perma.cc/N5NG-3ZQE] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
37.
Joan-Ram6n Borrell et al., EvaluatingAntitrust Leniency Programs,10 J. OF
COMP. L. & ECON. 107, 111 (2013).
Id.
38.
39.
See, e.g., S6bastien Broos et al., Analyse Statistique des Affaires d'Ententes
dans l'UE (2004-2014), 67 REVUE tCONOMIQUE 79, 85 (2016); Ann O'Brien, Leadershipof
Leniency, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION,

supra note 24, at 18; Chcile Aubert et al., The Impact of Leniency and Whiste-Blowing
ProgramsOn Cartels, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241, 1241-42 (2006); Hammond, supra note

2, at 83-84.

2017]

THE PERKS OF BEING A WHISTLEBLOWER

545

praised the U.S. Corporate Leniency Policy saying that it has served to
40
break "more cartels than all other tools at our disposal combined,"
while Thomas Barnett deems the program "[the DOJ's] greatest source
of cartel evidence." 41 Indeed, one can intuitively visualize a correlation
between the number of collusive practices busted through leniency and
the overall success of the policy as a tool for cartel detection. However,
the true effectiveness of the policy rests on whether it serves to deter
cartel formation, 42 and, ultimately, on its welfare-enhancing ability.
From this perspective, "higher numbers of detected and convicted
cartels alone are not necessarily good indicators of success. Since
competition policy's main objective is increasing welfare [by deterring
cartels], ideally a successful policy should reduce cartel formation and
43
prices rather than increase convictions."
Estimating the deterrent effect of antitrust policies is more
difficult than in other disciplines since, as Maria Bigoni notes, the
population of cartels and changes in it are unobservable.44 Since the
early 2000s, a wide range of scholarly studies in the fields of law and
economics have attempted to assess the impact of leniency on cartel
deterrence. In 2003, the pivotal work of Massimo Motta and Michele
Polo stressed the potential value of leniency for the dissuasion of
collusive conduct. 45 On this solid basis, further ground-breaking
theoretical economic studies have subsequently come to the general
conclusion that collusion is made difficult by leniency programs, albeit
46
using different models and attaining varied outcomes.

Scott D. Hammond, Cracking Cartels with Leniency Programs, JUSTICE
40.
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/cracking-cartels-leniencyprograms [https://perma.cc/QGV4-M6A9] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
Thomas 0. Barnett, Global Antitrust Enforcement, JUSTICE NEWS (Sept. 26,
41.
2007), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/global-antitrust-enforcement [https://perma.cc/
NCA7-8D59] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
Choi & Gerlach, supra note 31, at 532-35.
42.
William E. Kovacic, A Case for Capping the Dosage: Leniency and
43.
CompetitionAuthority Governance, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY

AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION, supranote 24, at 130 (warning against calculating the success
of leniency by numbers: "[t]he sheer volume of leniency-inspired cases and financial
recoveries do not provide a confident basis" for determining whether leniency does in fact
work); Maria Bigoni et al., Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust, 43 RAND J. ECON.
368, 369 (2011).
Bigoni et al., supra note 43, at 369.
44.
45.
Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency Programsand Cartel Prosecution,
21 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 347, 372 (2003).
See Joseph E. Harrington & Myong-Hun Chang, Modeling the Birth and
46.
Death of Cartels with an Application to EvaluatingCompetition Policy, 7 J. EUR. ECON.
ASS'N, 1400-01 (2009); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, in
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 259 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press, 2008);
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Behavioral Screening and the Detection of Cartels, in
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The outcome of the initial empirical works was somewhat
unclear. 47 A study by Nathan Miller of the use of leniency in the United
States between 1985 and 2005 found that, since the 1993 revision of
the Corporate Leniency Policy, 48 there was an initial increase in the

number of cartel discoveries and then a sharp drop. Such a trend would
be consistent with a policy that enhances deterrence. 49 In the
European Union, an investigation conducted in 2009 of the impact of
the original E.U. leniency policy of 1996 did not produce any evidence
that collusion had been made more difficult by the program. 50 The
preliminary findings of the latest studies, however, which use more
recent data and illustrate the impact of the revised 2003 program, are
more encouraging.5 1 For example, Jun Zhou's analysis of E.U. leniency
in cartel investigations between 1985 and 2011 suggests a similar
pattern to that detected by Miller in the U.S. context. 52 These
conclusions are further supported by a raft of experimental studies
conducted in the past ten years, which generally report that leniency
discourages cartel formation. 53 Thus, leniency leads to the formation
of fewer cartels and makes those that do emerge appear less stable. 54
The results of these works, while generally pointing towards
successful cartel deterrence, do not really shed much light on a leniency
policy's impact on welfare and economic efficiency. They are limited in
that "[t]hey can only estimate the effects of policies actually

&

ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 82, 85-90 (M. Dewatripont, L.P. Hansen
S.J. Turnovsky eds., 2003); Choi & Gerlach, supra note 31, at 529.
47.
Jun Zhou, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Leniency abstract (Working Paper,
2011), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256027164_NewEvidenceonthe Efficacy
sofLeniency (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DKW5-UC8T] (archived Feb. 7,
2017).
See infra subsection II.C.1.
48.
49.
Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON.
REV. 750, 755 (2009).
50.
Steffen Brenner, An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency
Program,27 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 641 (2009). See also infra subsection II.C.2.
51.
Jun Zhou, Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected
Cartels:Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on CartelDuration2 (GESY, Discussion
Paper No. 353, 2011), http://www.sfbtrl5.de/uploads/media/353_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N93B-3A2P] (archived Feb. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Zhou, Evaluating Leniency]; Gordon
Klein, Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs - Empirical Evidence 4-5 (ZEW,
Discussion Paper No. 10-107, 2010), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dpl0107.pd) (last
visited Feb. 7, 2017) [https://perma.ccl6KLV-JE7R] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
Zhou, EvaluatingLeniency, supra note 51, at 1-2.
52.
See generally Jos6 Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten,
53.
Blowing the Whistle, 31 ECON. THEORY 143, 143-66 (2007) (discussing leniency laws and
their impact on collusive cartel behavior as seen in experimental studies); Peter T.
Dijkstra, Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, Leniency Programsand the Design of
Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Unrestricted Communication 18 (2012),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228842423_LeniencyPrograms-and-theDesig
n ofAntitrustExperimentalEvidence withUnrestrictedCommunication [https://
perma.cc/SF9H-97SN] (archived Feb. 4, 2017); Hinloopen & Soetevent, supra note 15, at
607, 611.
Hinloopen & Soetevent, supranote 15, at 611.
54.

2017]

THE PERKS OF BEINGA WHISTLEBLOWER

547

implemented, not those of the many available alternatives, and they
focus on cartel formation rather than on welfare." 55 Catarina Marvio
and Giancarlo Spagnolo recently emphasized the shortcomings of the
data currently available, stating that "it is unclear whether [leniency
policies] are actually increasing welfare by generating a strong
deterrent effect, or whether they are reducing welfare through the
larger administration and prosecution costs they generate, without any
compensating increase in deterrence." 56 Moreover, whereas the main
findings of the experimental research point towards effectiveness, they
have also shown that, in some cases, leniency leads to higher prices
when a cartel does form.5 7 For example, Bigoni establishes that, while
on average prices are lower, those for existing cartels tend to increase,
and the cartel may become more stable through leniency. 58
Importantly, and linked to this idea of cartel stability, Joseph
Harrington and Myong Hun Chang recently considered the effects of
leniency on non-leniency enforcement-that is, the number of cartels
that are cracked by means other than leniency applications. s9 Since
antitrust authorities have limited resources, handling leniency cases,
they say, unavoidably means that fewer resources will be available for
non-leniency investigations. This may have a negative impact on the
race to report that leniency programs are presumed to trigger: if the
likelihood of conviction in the absence of leniency requests is low, it
could reduce the fear of getting caught and jeopardize the effects of the
prisoner's dilemma created by leniency. 6 0 Interestingly, their study
finds that, in industries where collusion is reasonably stable, leniency
can increase the duration of collusion because "stable cartels are more
concerned with detection and prosecution through non-leniency
means."61
Further theoretical and empirical studies using data available in
a wider number of jurisdictions, and over a more prolonged period of
time, are needed in order to attain greater certainty about the effects
of leniency on cartel deterrence and welfare. However, on the basis of
the data readily available, it is possible to conclude that leniency

Bigoni et al., supra note 43, at 369.
55.
56.
Catarina Marvio & Giancarlo Spagnolo, What Do We Know About the
Effectiveness of Leniency Policies?A Survey of the Empiricaland ExperimentalEvidence,
in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION, supra

note 24, at 21.
Joseph E. Harrington & Myong-Hun Chang, Endogenous Antitrust
57.
Enforcement in the Presence of a CorporateLeniency Program 2 (Working Paper, 2013)
[hereinafter Harrington & Chang, Endogenous] https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/files/?
whdmsaction=public:main.file&fileID=5147 [https://perma.cc/A4P5-AYJY] (archived Feb.
7, 2017).
Bigoni et al., supra note 43, at 370.
58.
Harrington & Chang, Endogenous, supra note 57, at 1.
59.
See generally id. (explaining the game theory rationale for this possible
60.
phenomenon); see also supra Section II.A.
Harrington & Chang, Endogenous, supra note 57, at 4-5.
61.
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programs appear to have generally performed satisfactorily,
particularly in relation to cartel detection and prevention. The
literature has also underlined other important practical advantages of
leniency, including the creation of incentives to denounce collusion 62
(without leniency, firms would never benefit from reporting), 63 a
reduction in the cost of cartel investigations, 64 a faster investigation
and prosecution process,6 5 and a positive impact on the perception of a
country's antitrust policy among the business community. 66 But these
benefits are not automatically present in every leniency program;
adequate policy design is paramount in order to create the desired race
to report that destroys collusion. 67 This need poses a new, equally
complex dilemma: how to devise a sound leniency program.
C. Adequate Leniency Policy Design: The Theory
Any attempt to delineate a general theoretical framework for the
assessment of leniency programs is hampered by the importance of
context. What might work very well in one jurisdiction might not be as
effective in another displaying dissimilar characteristics. 68 This is
particularly true in antitrust, as the economic environment is
paramount both at the time of legislating and at the time of enforcing
the law. The literature that has, to date, discussed the features of
robust leniency programs has focused mainly on the corporate leniency
policies of the United States and the European Union. 69 Prior to
assessing the lessons that can be drawn from the practical experience
of these studies, 70 this Section discusses the issues that must be taken
into consideration when designing leniency programs so as to ensure
that they serve the purpose for which they were implemented in the
first place.
Despite the practical limitations affecting the search for general
parameters through which to assess specific leniency policies, certain
features emerge as fundamental in the construction of any system that
rewards informants who come forward and help bring down the
unlawful activity of which they have been part. As an initial matter,

Brenner, supra note 50, at 630-40.
Zhijun Chen & Patrick Rey, On the Design of Leniency Programs,56 J. L.
925 (2013).
Motta & Polo, supra note 45, at 349.
Brenner, supra note 50, at 644.
Borrell et al., supra note 37, at 136.
FOX & CRANE, supra note 1, at 77.
See Fox & Gal, supra note 19, at 5-6 (noting the importance of context in
&
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63.
EcoN. 917,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
antitrust).
69.

For a general overview of specific leniency policies, see SAMANTHA MOBLEY

& Ross DENTON, GLOBAL CARTELS HANDBOOK: LENIENCY: POLICY AND PROCEDURE

(Oxford University Press, 2011). The very useful book is directed at practitioners, and
does not enter into a discussion of the merits of the various programs.
70.
See infra Part II.
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leniency programs play on universal emotions, such as the fear of
getting caught and the mistrust towards partners in illegal activity. In
practice, the behavior of informants is less based on precise cost-benefit
71
analyses than on the presence of such fear and mistrust. And the
latter is less dependent on context than cost-benefit assessments.
Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that, as regimes become more
experienced, a noticeable degree of convergence can be observed in'
leniency policies around the world. 72 In addition to, inter alia,
facilitating multi-jurisdictional leniency applications, " convergence
enables comparisons on the basis of which a general structure for the
evaluation of the merits of specific programs can be built.
Leniency programs are part of a wider antitrust strategy to
combat cartels. They are thus inextricably related to the fight against
the secret, harmful activity that is collusion. The general line of the
strategy against cartelization is the carrot-and-stick approach
74
and indirectly fleshed out by former
frequently described by scholars
75
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hammond. The "stick" would
principally be the severe sanctions and a high risk of detection, and the
"carrot" would be the reward of leniency offered to informants. 76 Based
on this, there are two principal strands of factors that determine
whether a leniency program is suitably designed: the efficacy of the
risk and the sanctions that form part of the stick, and the quality of
the reward that is the carrot. Each of these will be assessed in turn.
1. Internal Policy Design: The Carrot

.

I

The internal effectiveness of a leniency program can be measured
77
by the incentive to self-report that it generates. Self-reporting will
happen only if firms, fearing that their illegal activity might be
detected by the enforcer, sense that they are both duly protected and
adequately rewarded by the policy. Thus there are two essential factors

For instance, according to Wils, companies can be expected to base their
71.
decisions on the basis on the risks they perceive, rather than on thorough cost-benefit
analyses. Wouter P. J. Wils, The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An
Assessment After Twenty Years, 39 WORLD COMPETITION 327, 343-46 (2016) [hereinafter
Wils, The Use of Leniency].
Said convergence is frequently highlighted in the literature. See O'Brien,
72.
supra note 39, at 17, 19; FOX & CRANE, supra note 1, at 77.
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE:
73.
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 38 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2004) [hereinafter

HAWK]; See infra Section III.C.
FOX & CRANE, supra note 1, at 75-92.
74.
Scott D. Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Division
75.
U.S. Department of Justice, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program Address at
the ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs (Nov. 22-23, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/206611.htm [https://perma.ccV7M2-ECP9] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
76.
Id. See also Fox & CRANE, supra note 1 (discussing this policy); O'Brien,
supra note 39, at 20.
FOX & CRANE, supra note 1, at 78.
77.
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in leniency policy design. First, leniency policies need to offer adequate
protection to whistleblowers, so as to avoid situations in which
reporting will put them at greater risk than any reward they may
obtain through the program. To this end, transparency and
predictability are frequently highlighted as crucial in leniency.78 But
the principal challenge when it comes to protecting informants is
ensuring confidentiality. Without this assurance, it might prove very
complicated to convince firms to self-report, as they may face
retaliation from other cartelists and, above all, the risk of being
severely punished in other jurisdictions.
This last threat is particularly acute in the case of international
cartels, which might be contrary to antitrust laws in multiple parts of
the world. And international collusion abounds: there were 516
investigations of suspected international cartels between 1990 and
2008. 7 Supposing a firm decides to self-report in one of the
jurisdictions, the company may qualify for leniency under the relevant
leniency program. However, if the information obtained through
leniency can be requested by antitrust enforcers in other regimes,
where the penalties imposed may be higher or where the leniency
applicant may be subject to damage claims, then leniency would
actually put this company in a worse position vis-a-vis other cartelists.
Diminishing this disincentive can be accomplished by imposing very
high information-sharing requirements, as well as through the
facilitation of simultaneous leniency applications in various
jurisdictions.
Second, with regard to the reward of the policy, it is important to
note that leniency comes in two forms: it could be a grant of immunity
or reduction in the penalties that would otherwise be applicable, or it
could be a grant of positive financial rewards. Giving the informant a
financial recompense or a "bounty," such as a portion of the fines
collected from those whose illegal conduct was prosecuted thanks to
the report, is uncommon, but not unheard of. so There have been

78.

See generally id.; UNCTAD MENA PROGRAMME, COMPETITION GUIDELINES:

LENIENCY PROGRAMMES, ¶1.2(c) (June 22, 2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
ditcclp20l6d3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLZ3-ZEZE] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
79.
John M. Connor, Cartels and Antitrust Portrayed: Private International
Cartels from 1990 to 2008 4 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 09-06, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstractjid=1467310 [https://perma.cc/CEQ7CE22] (archived Feb. 25, 2017).
80.
For example, the UK and Korea leniency programs offer positive rewards.
On the latter, see Andreas Stephan, Is the Korean Innovation of Individual Informant
Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool? in CARTELS IN ASIA: LAW AND PRACTICE 109,
110 (Thomas Cheng, Sandra Marco Colino & Burton Ong eds., 2015). Beyond the realms
of antitrust, one such example can be found in the U.S. Civil False Claims Act, by which
individuals who act as informants of fraud in procurement contracts may be entitled to
a share of the fines imposed. Aubert, Rey & Kovacic, supra note 46, at 1243. On the
advantages of offering rewards to leniency applicants, see also Bigoni et al., supra note
43, at 370.
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arguments made that such bounties would be "stronger tools than
leniency programs to deter cartel formation," 81 provided that the
recompense was "large enough to outweigh the cost of returning to the
competition outcome in all the future periods." 82 Spagnolo also argues
that the first informant should be offered a recompense equal to the
sum of the fines paid by the convicted firms. If the fine is sufficiently
high, full deterrence would theoretically be achieved at zero cost. 83
Spagnolo acknowledges, however, that positive rewards might not be
feasible, so reduced fines can also be helpful, as they would decrease
the cost of deviating from the cartel agreement.8 4
If the rewards offered to leniency applicants are too generous,
there is also a risk of strategic exploitation of the policy. 85 The
possibility that companies will abuse leniency programs has not
escaped the notice of economists such as Motta and Polo 86 or Julien
Sauvagnat.87 Motta and Polo raise the issue that reduced penalties
could have "ex-ante a pro-collusive effect." 88 From a legal perspective,
Wouter Wils, who has written extensively on the European Union's
leniency policy,8 9 recently revisited the prospect of using leniency as a
platform to facilitate the creation and maintenance of cartels in
systems that do not include incarceration as a potential penalty for
collusion. He points out that, "[i]n situations where the same
companies participate in a number of cartels in different markets, or
repeatedly form cartels over time, one could imagine a system in which
cartel participants take turns to apply for leniency, every time one of
90
the cartels is (about to be) detected by the competition authority."
Such tactics are commonly referred to as collude-and-report
91
Upon examining the E.U. experience, however, he finds no
strategies.
"convincing example" of this taking place in practice. 92 However, the
potential to abuse the system has to be accounted for, and the
incentivizing benefit of transparency and predictability needs to be
balanced against the risk of implementing such a foreseeable strategy
that firms can learn to use to their best advantage.
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Id. at 1248.
82.
Spagnolo, Divide et Impera, supra note 23, at 19-20.
83.
Id. at 20-23.
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Another issue related to the reward of the policy is the moral
implication of pardoning a lawbreaker. Wils touches on this problem
and finds a potential solution in the adoption of programs that are
proportionate to the aims they pursue, to ensure that the leniency
granted is no more "than [is] strictly necessary to obtain the positive
enforcement effects, and to stress the condition for any
beneficiary .

.

. to

provide

genuine

and full

cooperation

to

the

enforcement authorities." 93 Two principal strategies are typically used
to palliate both the potential abuses of leniency and the diminishment
of retributive justice. First, the predominant position in the literature
is that leniency should only be offered to the first company to come
forward, 9" and it should consist of full (as opposed to partial)
immunity, without positive rewards.95 Second, leniency should not
extend to civil damage claims, meaning that the informant will not be
able to avoid having to compensate the victims of its harmful illegal
behavior. Whereas some retribution is unavoidably sacrificed by
pardoning the administrative and/or criminal actions of the
whistleblower, part of the retributory "payback effect" is safeguarded
with the preservation of reparatory justice through civil litigation. (The
effect of damages on leniency will be explored further below.) 96
2. External Factors Affecting the Success of Leniency: The Stick
The effectiveness of leniency is highly dependent on the
characteristics of the specific antitrust regulation and the general legal
system it forms a part of and helps to enforce. As seen above, most
regimes do not offer positive rewards, meaning that one factor is the
attractiveness of leniency, which resides in the stiffness of the
penalties it helps self-reporters avoid. Provided that there is a risk of
detection looming over companies behaving illegally, the harsher the
punishment envisaged, the more attractive leniency applications will
appear. Thus, determining the most appropriate means to penalize
anticompetitive behavior in general and collusion in particular is a
rather intricate task and is one that has inspired fascinating academic
discussions.9 7 An exhaustive evaluation of cartel punishment exceeds
the scope of this Article, but, for present purposes, leniency should be
more efficient in antitrust regimes that allow for the imposition of high

-
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See Sauvagnat, supranote 87, at 325.
95.
On the limitations and perverse effects of partial immunity, see Chen
Harrington, supra note 28, at 59-80.
See infra subsection II.C.2.
96.
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Deterrence:An Empirical Comparison of Sanctions to Overcharge, U. OF BALT. (2011);
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fines through administrative or criminal enforcement. By contrast, if
the sanctions imposed are a mere tax on what is a very lucrative
activity, there will be little incentive to break the trust of the cartel.98
The temptation to apply for leniency will be greatest in those regimes
that also incorporate jail terms (yet only a few jurisdictions
contemplate individual criminal sanctions).99
Another external factor relates to the protection of confidentiality
that leniency programs ought to guarantee, as discussed above. 100 In
addition to the privacy assurances within leniency policies,
confidentiality will be largely reliant on how competition agencies
engage in information sharing. In this respect, Jay Choi and Heiko
Gerlach have attempted to establish the amount and kind of
information that should be pooled in a fight against international
cartels. 101 They consider three scenarios in which a cartel could
potentially be discovered in two jurisdictions. First, if there is no
coordination and no information sharing, the incentive to self-report is
virtually nonexistent. International cartels are highly lucrative, and,
if caught, their members would likely offset the costs of the penalties
imposed in one jurisdiction with the benefits they are obtaining in
other markets. Second, if antitrust authorities share case information
but not leniency applications, there ought to be a higher cartel
detection probability coupled with an increased chance of successful
conviction in each jurisdiction. Third, if confidentiality is not granted
to leniency applicants, the results would be ambiguous: firms will
either self-report in both jurisdictions or in neither. In this sense,
enabling informants to simultaneously seek leniency in all the
jurisdictions where the cartel may be investigated would be desirable.
Finally, and related to the above concerns, the availability of
damages through antitrust civil litigation is another factor that affects
the effectiveness of leniency programs. Since damages are not
condoned when immunity is granted, in theory the easier it is for
injured parties to go to court to claim compensation, and the higher the
reparation they may be entitled to, the more difficult it would be to
convince cartelists to self-report. The problem, as explained by Paolo
Buccirossi, is that leniency applications actually boost the chances of
successful damages claims by victims of collusion, 102 both in the

See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, SanctioningCartelActivity: Let the Punishment
98.
Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 23 (2009) (insisting that cartels "should be
prohibited rather than merely taxed").
The United States and the United Kingdom are among these. See Gilbert
99.
Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENTAL
DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 278

(M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundmann eds., 1978) (discussing the deterrent effect
of imprisonment).
See supra subsection 1I.C.1.
100.
Choi & Gerlach, supra note 31, at 529-30.
101.
Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marvdo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and
102.
Damages 2 (Stockholm Inst. of Transition Econ. Working Paper No. 32, 2015).
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jurisdiction where leniency is sought and in others where
confidentiality is not guaranteed. In this respect, while Spagnolo
emphasizes the importance of limiting the accountability of the
leniency applicant,1 03 Buccirossi goes further and raises the possibility
of eliminating this liability altogether, if the other cartelists are able
to account for the damages caused by the leniency applicant. 104
Positive rewards could also be used to compensate the effect of damage
claims on leniency applicants, as proposed by Frederik Silbye.105
Summing up the arguments put forward in this Section, for
leniency policies to achieve their maximum deterrent effect, they ought
to guarantee at least full immunity, if not positive rewards. Positive
rewards might be the most efficient in economic terms and can
neutralize the cost of compensation for victims, but a moral argument
may be raised against rewarding wrongdoers. Moreover, an excessively
generous, transparent, and predictable policy might lead to
undesirable strategic misuses of the policy.
For leniency policies to achieve their maximum incentivizing
effect, granting confidentiality in leniency applications appears to be
vital. Cross-border agency cooperation is paramount in order to bring
down international cartels, but there is a strong argument for limiting
it to sharing information about issues other than leniency applications,
unless multi-jurisdictional leniency applications are facilitated
through cross-border convergence. How these features and
recommendations play out in specific leniency programs is the object of
the next Part.
III. THE PRACTICE OF POLICY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF LENIENCY IN
ESTABLISHED ANTITRUST REGIMES

The leniency programs of the United States, Canada, and the
European Union are frequently referred to as the "Big Three" corporate
leniency policies. 106 At this point in the Article, having already
sketched the theoretical framework for assessing the quality of
leniency programs, it seems appropriate to examine the practice of the
policies that already have some mileage and that have proven their
ability to bring down cartels. Rather than providing a comprehensive,
overwhelmingly descriptive account of each regime, the focus here is
on the evolution of the U.S. and E.U. programs, the features that make
them successful, and any outstanding issues that remain to be
addressed.

103.
Spagnolo, Divide et Impera, supranote 23, at 15-17.
104.
Buccirossi, Marvdo & Spagnolo, supra note 102, at 5.
105.
Frederik Silbye, A Note on Antitrust Damages and Leniency Programs, 33
EUR. J. L. & EcoN. 691, 699 (2012).
106.
See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 19.
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A. The United States
The idea of using leniency to fight cartels is attributed to the
prosecutors at the Antitrust Division of the DOJ.1 0 7 It is unsurprising

that it was in the United States where such a policy was first
introduced. The U.S. Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, is the oldest
competition law statute still applicable today and has served as
inspiration for modern antitrust regimes around the world. 10 The first
Corporate Leniency Policy in the United States dates back to 1978, but
this version was largely unsuccessful. Under that policy, leniency was
only available provided that no investigation had yet been initiated by
the DOJ, and even then it was discretionary.
Furthermore, in exercising this discretion, seven requirements
had to be fulfilled in order to decide whether to grant leniency: (1) the
firm had to be the first to blow the whistle; (2) the confession should be
a "truly corporate act," as opposed to isolated individual confessions;
(3) the DOJ should not reasonably expect to become aware of the
undercover cartel without the report of the leniency applicant; (4) the
company was required to promptly terminate its involvement in the
cartel; (5) consideration was given to the "candor and completeness"
with which the firm reported the violation and assisted the DOJ in the
investigation; (6) the nature of the wrongdoing and the whistleblower's
involvement also had to be examined; and finally, (7) the leniency
applicant had to have made or had to intend to make restitution to
those injured by the illegal activity. 0 9 Given the high threshold for
qualifying for leniency under this policy, in its fifteen years of
application only seventeen companies filed for leniency, of which just
ten were granted full immunity.1 10 Unsurprisingly, the 1978 policy has
been deemed "perhaps the least well understood and most infrequently

Id. at 17.
107.
But see Lloyd Duhaime, 1889 Canada Wheels Out World's First Competition
108.
Statute, DUHAIME'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (May 31, 2012), http://www.duhaime.org/
LawMuseum/CanadianLegalHistory/LawArticle-1420/1889-Canada-Wheels-Out-WorldsFirst-Competition-Statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/6224-DV7Q] (archived Feb. 5, 2017)
(explaining that Canada enacted its original Competition Act in 1889, one year before
the Sherman Act was passed, making the former the first modern antitrust statute in
the world).
Gary R. Spratling & D. Jarrett Arp, The InternationalLeniency Revolution:
109.
The Transformation of InternationalCartel Enforcement During The First Ten Years Of
The United States' 1993 Corporate Amnesty/Immunity Policy, A.B.A. SECTION OF
ANTITRUST L. ANNUAL MEETING 2 (2003), http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/
pubs/Spratling-Arp%20ABA2003_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8ZE-UPUK] (archived
Feb. 5, 2017).
110.
Gary R. Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division,
Address at the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Symposium: Corporate Crime in America:
Strengthening the "Good Citizen" Corporation (Sept. 8, 1995), in KY P. EWING,
COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21- CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE
623 (2d ed. 2006).
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invoked criminal law policy of the Antitrust Division,""'
In order to tackle these shortcomings and invigorate the strategy,
the DOJ revised its corporate leniency policy in 1993 and 1994,112
introducing an individual leniency program. 113 The changes,
attributed principally to the then Assistant Attorney General Anne
Bingaman, 114 modified the regime along three main lines: the
confirmation of the "first-informant rule," 115 by virtue of which
leniency would now be automatically guaranteed to the first company
to come forward with information on a cartel not already under
investigation; the inclusion of a "postinvestigation amnesty" rule,1 16
allowing that the first informant might be granted amnesty in
exchange for cooperation even when an investigation is already
underway; and, perhaps most importantly, the extension of leniency to
individuals (e.g., directors, officials, and employees) who provide
information such that they too could be granted immunity from
criminal prosecution." 7
The reform was successful in terms of the number of requests and
the amounts of the fines imposed.1 8 By 2010, there were twenty times
more applications than there were under the original policy," 9 and 90
percent of the $5 billion paid in penalties for antitrust violations
between 1996 and 2010 was obtained in the context of investigations
that involved leniency requests. In fact, in 1999 alone, the total amount
of the fines imposed was higher than the sum of all the penalties levied
during the entire prior 109-year history of U.S. antitrust
enforcement.12 0 Although this rise in the cost of antitrust violations is
also a consequence of the steep increase in the financial penalties that
could be imposed, the role of leniency was undeniably vital to
uncovering and prosecuting these collusive practices. 121

111.
Robert E. Bloch, Past Practiceand FuturePromise: The Antitrust Division's
CorporateAmnesty Program, 8 ANTITRUST 28, 28 (2003).
112.

See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY

(Aug. 10,

1993), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0091.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3W5V-342V] (archived Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter US 1993 Leniency Policy].
113.

See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (Aug. 10,

1994), https://www.justice.gov/atr/individual-leniency-policy [https://perma.cc/KAA8X9TL] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
114.
William E. Kovacic, A Case for Capping the Dosage: Leniency and Competition
Authority Governance, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY

RELIGION, supranote 24, at 125.
115.
Chen & Rey, supranote 63, at 917.
116.
Id.
117.
O'Brien, supra note 39, at 18.
118.
Id.
119.
Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, The
Evolution of CriminalAntitrust Enforcement over the Last Two Decades, presented at
the National Institute on White Collar Crime 2-3 (Feb. 25, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/53AY-JCSH] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
120.
Aubert, Rey & Kovacic, supra note 46, at 1242.
121.
Id. at 1242-43.

20171

THE PERKS OF BEING A WHISTLEBLOWER

557

Perhaps the best known case to date in which leniency has been
used remains the investigation of the lysine cartel in the food additives
industry in the mid-1990S. 1 2 2 In 1996, Archer Daniels-Midland (ADM)
was fined $100 million for its participation in the collusive practice,
and the secret recordings of the meetings were widely shared with the
business community and the general public in what has been described
as a "wise marketing move" on the part of the DOJ. 123 Interestingly,
the immunity granted to informant Mark Whitacre was eventually
revoked, as he was found guilty of embezzlement and sentenced to nine
years in jail. 124
After the 1993-1994 revision, it took years for applications under
the improved policy to start flowing in, in all likelihood because no
company wanted to be the one to test the waters. 125 Finally, in May
1999, Rh6ne-Poulenc's cooperated with the DOJ under the new
corporate leniency policy to break up a vitamins cartel. This
cooperation resulted in a criminal fine of $500 million being imposed
on cartel instigator Hoffman-La Roche, and a further fine of $225
million being levied against BASF. This case was the first in which a
foreign executive got a jail sentence in the United States for
participating in collusion.
The revised policy also notoriously came into play in the mid1990s price-fixing scandal involving the competing auction houses
Sotheby's and Christie's. Christopher Davidge, Christie's chief
executive at the time, filed for leniency in the context of an ongoing
DOJ investigation against the auction houses. Davidge and Christie's
were respectively granted individual and corporate leniency in
exchange for their cooperation and provision of evidence of the
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 126 The case
culminated in the conviction of Sotheby's and its chief executive Alfred
Taubman. Fines were also imposed on the art houses' collusive
practices under Canadian and E.U. competition law, with Davidge also
7
filing for leniency under the latter.' 2
Interestingly, in 2003, the company Stolt-Nielsen became the first

See, e.g., KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A TRUE STORY (2000) (telling
122.
the story of Mark Whitacre, the FBI's confidential informant who recorded conversations
that evidenced collusion at ADM).
123.
See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 22-24.
124.

JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE OUR ENEMY

411 (2001).
125.
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Matthew E. Raiff,
Lessons for CompetitionPolicy from the Vitamins Cartel23-25 (2005), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=818744 [https://perma.cc/9W9K-CR23] (archived Feb.
5, 2017).
126.
See generally Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and
Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions and Sotheby's and Christie's, 1 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 3, 7-10 (2005).
127.
CHRISTOPHER HARDING AND JENNIFER EDWARDS, CARTEL CRIMINALITY: THE
MYTHOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF BUSINESS COLLUSION 167-76 (2015).
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to have its leniency rescinded, on the grounds that it did not take
"prompt and effective action" to end conspiratorial activities, and did
not offer its full and complete cooperation. 12 8 These highly publicized
cases left no doubt that the policy was fully operational and that
cartelists choosing not to use it could face serious legal consequences.
B. The European Union
Following the leniency trend set by the United States, most
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries, 129 and more than fifty antitrust jurisdictions around the
world, have implemented similar policies to help combat collusion.1 30
The European Union adopted its first immunity policy in 1996, when
the European Commission published its original Leniency Notice.' 3 1
Under this policy there was no guarantee of full immunity for the
informant. Rather, only 75 percent of the fine was guaranteed to be
waived on the first company to come forward, and, in practice, full
immunity was only ever granted to three companies. 132 Such a
limitation on leniency had an undesired effect on transparency and
predictability, and, as predicted by Harrington and Chen in their
assessment of partial immunity, it jeopardized the effectiveness of the
policy. 1 3 3

This shortcoming was addressed in the first revision of the policy
in 2002.134 The 2002 Leniency Notice allowed fines to be completely
waived provided the following conditions are met at the time of the
leniency request: the applicant (1) must provide all evidence in its
possession immediately, (2) must ensure full cooperation throughout
the investigation, (3) must cease its involvement in the cartel, (4) must
not be a cartel instigator by having encouraged the participation of
other undertakings in the collusive practice, and, (5) must be the first
to provide evidence that would allow the European Commission to
conduct a dawn raid or to find an infringement of Article 101(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).135
The current version of the E.U. leniency policy can be found in the

128.
Jim Walden and Kristopher Dawes, The Curious Case of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v
United States, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Mar. 2005).
129.
Bigoni et al., supra note 43, at 2.
130.
Fox & CRANE, supra note 1, at 77-78.
131.
See European Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of
Fines in Cartel Cases 1996 OJ (C207/4) (the 1996 Leniency Notice).
132.
Jatinder S. Sandhu, The European Commission's Leniency Policy: A
Success?, 28 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. 148, 149 (2007).
133.
See Chen &. Harrington, supranote 28, at 17-18.
134.
European Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of
Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002 OJ [C45/3] (EU 2002 Leniency Notice).
135.
Id. IT 8-11.
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2006 Leniency Notice,1 36 which revised the program for a second time
to ensure greater legal certainty and clarity and to bring the system
more in line with U.S. policy.' 3 7 In this reform, three aspects were
prioritized. First, a "marker" system was introduced, by virtue of which
companies can be secured a place in the queue of leniency applicants
the moment they submit an application. 138 They are subsequently
afforded some time to gather the supporting documents that prove the
existence of collusion, and they are informed as to whether they are the
first to seek leniency. Unfortunately, the marker is discretionary, and
it is up to the European Commission to grant it on a case-by-case
basis.13 9 Second,, the new policy provides some additional details as to
the evidentiary threshold for immunity. In its corporate leniency
statement, the company must provide a
detailed description of the alleged cartel arrangement, including for instance its
aims, activities and functioning; the product or service concerned, the geographic
scope, the duration of and the estimated market volumes affected by the alleged
cartel; the specific dates, locations, content of and participants in alleged cartel
contacts, and all relevant explanations in connection with the pieces of evidence
provided in support of the application.140

The cooperation requirements are therefore considerably high.
Third, oral corporate statements may now be used by the European
Commission as evidence,141 and there is a procedure by which they
may "constitute binding statements not subject to challenge by the
cooperating undertaking."1 42 The reason for the weight given to oral
statements is that, if written statements were required, litigants
claiming damages in other jurisdictions (particularly the United
States) might be tempted to seek discovery of such documents to
43
substantiate their claims.1
As in the United States, the revised E.U. leniency program,
combined with the rise of the amount of the fines imposed on
anticompetitive conduct, has proven fruitful. Between 2012 and 2016,
the total amount of the financial penalties imposed on cartels was close
to £9 billion, even after taking into account the adjustments made by
44
the E.U. courts to the Commission's fining decisions.1 A statistical
study of cartel decisions between 2004 and 2014 estimates that at least

Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
136.
Cases (EC) 2006 O.J. (C298/17) 1 [hereinafter EU 2006 Leniency Notice].
For a detailed and up-to-date analysis of the European Union's leniency
137.
policy, see Wils, The Use of Leniency, supranote 71.
EU 2006 Leniency Notice, supra note 136, ¶¶ 14-15.
138.
139.
Id. 1 15.
140.
Id. I 9(a).
141.
Id. ¶ 31.
Sandhu, supra note 132, at 156.
142.
143.
Id.
Commission Cartel Statistics (EC) (2016), http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/
144.
cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [https:/perma.cc/6JHF-MHNV] (archived Feb. 13, 2017).
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one undertaking sought leniency in 94 percent of cases assessed. 145
Importantly, in 2016, record fines-totaling nearly C3 billion-were
imposed on the members of a single cartel, truck producers MAN,
Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco, and DAF, for engaging in price fixing
for over fourteen years. 146
This case provides a clear illustration of the race to report
incentivized by the leniency program: 1VIAN, the first to come forward,
was granted full immunity. Volvo/Renault, Daimler, and Iveco also
filed for amnesty, albeit at a later stage, and they were given a 40, 30,
and 10 percent reduction in their fines, respectively. 147 In the end, all
but one of the cartelists applied for leniency. All participants got a
further 10 percent reduction under the 2008 Settlement Notice, 148 by
which the companies acknowledge their participation in the collusion,
as well as their liability, in exchange for a faster resolution and a
smaller penalty.
C. Convergence and Divergence in the United States and the European
Union
The adoption of leniency in the United States and the European
Union has been subject to a steep learning curve. The modifications
that have had to be introduced in both jurisdictions in order to make
the policies work in practice have led to certain convergences between
the two regimes. The similarity of regimes around the world is
desirable, as it makes it "much easier and far more attractive for
companies to simultaneously seek and obtain leniency in [all]
jurisdictions where the applicants have exposure." 149 Nonetheless,
important differences persist. These divergences can be explained in
part by the need to adapt to the specific context of each jurisdiction and
in part by the different degree of experience they possess.
One of the most notorious differences between United States and
European Union leniency programs relates to the reward given to those
who are not the first to come forward. In the United States, only the
first informant qualifies for leniency. 150 In the European Union,
however, although only the first informant may qualify for full
leniency, reductions in the fines of subsequent applicants may be

145.
Broos et al., supra note 39, at 85.
146.
Press Release IP/16/2582, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission
Fines Truck Producers C 2.93 Billion for Participating in a Cartel (July 19, 2016) (at the
time of writing, the full text of the decision had not yet been made available).
147.
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148.
Commission Notice on the Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of the
Adoption of Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No
1/2003 in cartel cases 2008 O.J. (C167/01) 1, 5, amended Communication from the
Commission 2015 O.J. (C256/2).
149.
HAWK, supra note 73, at 38.
150.
US 1993 Leniency Policy, supra note 112, § B(1).
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granted, provided that the information they supply-is of "significant
added value." 51 Such is the case when the information "strengthens,
by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the Commission's ability to
prove the alleged cartel," with greater value placed on "compelling
evidence." 152 According to Wils, granting the reduction will depend on
the potential of the evidence provided to strengthen the "ability to
prove the infringement." 153 It is only in the final decision that
applicants will find out whether they have indeed qualified for the
reduction, and within which band. 154 However, to increase legal
certainty, the European Commission will inform the relevant parties
of its preliminary 'conclusions.155 In practice, the divergence between
the two regimes is palliated by the possibility, under U.S. law, .of
entering into plea agreements with the DOJ, by which subsequent
firms who decide to cooperate with the investigation may be punished
less harshly.1 56 Such a policy is usually referred to as Leniency Plus or
Amnesty Plus.' 57
Another important E.U.-U.S. divergence is linked to the nature of
their enforcement systems. In the United States, there is not only
corporate leniency but also individual leniency. Under criminal
enforcement, individuals may be punished with fines and even jail
terms. This seems particularly adequate considering that, as Andreas
Stephan and Ali Nikpay explain, "cartels are not typically organised at
an institutional level within the firm. Many infringements are
perpetrated by a small number of rogue employees or within a
subsidiary with objectives that may not necessarily align with those of
its parent." 158 Leniency in the United States grants individual
protection from a potential criminal conviction, criminal fines, and
imprisonment for executives who cooperate. In the European Union,
only administrative and civil enforcement is possible, and the penalties
are imposed on the corporate entity and not on individuals, thus the
2006 Leniency Notice only refers to "undertakings" filing for leniency.
Under neither the European Union nor the United States regime does
the leniency granted extend to other jurisdictions or to damage claims.
However, in the United States, where treble damages and attorney's
fees may be recovered, leniency applicants will only be obliged to pay
their "pro rata share of the damages." 159 This is a considerable

EU 2006 Leniency Notice, supra note 136, 1 24.
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159.
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limitation that ought to make leniency applications much more
attractive, but such a reward is difficult to offer in jurisdictions that
are not as generous when it comes to compensating injured parties.
One important similarity between the jurisdictions is that the
successive revisions of the leniency policies in the United States and
the European Union have attempted to increase transparency, for
instance, via the marker system or by clarifying the kind of information
required for qualifying for immunity. An aspect on which applicants
require the utmost transparency and predictability is the difficult issue
of the confidentiality of leniency applications. The DOJ guarantees an
entirely paperless procedure1 60 and vows to not disclose the identity of
the informant without a court order. 161 Hammond, while
acknowledging that such a high degree of confidentiality might be
deemed problematic, claims that it is "a necessary inducement to
encourage leniency applications." 16 2 In the European Union, accepting
oral statements as sufficient proof of collusion is also designed to
prevent claimants in other jurisdictions from having access to the
evidence, but it is unclear whether there are any circumstances under
which a written transcript of the oral statement could be obtained.16 3
In the light of the calls to address this important issue1 64 and the
growing concerns about a possible decrease in the number of leniency
applications for fear of civil liability, 165 in March 2017 the E.U.
Commission announced the launch of a new tool enabling anonymous
whistleblowing. 166 The new system, called the Anonymous
Whistleblower Tool, complements the existing E.U. leniency policy: it
has a wider scope of application, as it is not limited to cartels nor cartel
participants, and it can be used by any individuals "who have
knowledge of the existence or functioning of a cartel or other types of

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140779/LDMBRI(2
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antitrust violations to help end such practices."
granted

167

Anonymity is

through a specifically-designed encrypted messaging system that allows two way
communications. The service is run by a specialised external service provider
that acts as an intermediary, and which relays only the content of received
messages without forwarding any metadata that could be used to identify the
individual providing the information.168

By extending the ability to blow the whistle to anyone with
knowledge of an anticompetitive activity of any kind, this new system
has the potential to increase the risk of detection. However, if a cartel
participant wishes to report anonymously, it will not be able benefit
from immunity or a reduction in fines. Therefore, its potential to fix
the transparency and predictability problems of traditional leniency
remains limited.
IV. LENIENCY POLICY DESIGN IN YOUNG ANTITRUST REGIMES

If the U.S. and E.U. experiences are anything to go by, sculpting
effective leniency programs is a complex exercise that involves a great
deal of learning-by-doing. The policy-molding process is even more
intricate in the context of younger antitrust jurisdictions, where prelenience cartel-busting experience is at best scarce and at worst
nonexistent. This Part of the Article explores just how leniency policy
design takes place in newer competition-law regimes and how attempts
to replicate the programs of experienced jurisdictions have to be
measured against the need to adapt to circumstantial demands. The
comprehensive leniency policy recently adopted in Hong Kong is used
as an illustrative example of how this applies in practice.
A. The Proliferationof Antitrust and the Problem of Copy-and-Paste
Regulation
Since World War II, a global antitrust trend has led to the
adoption of laws protective of competition in over 130 jurisdictions.
Most regimes are still in their infancy: in 1995, there were only thirty9
five antitrust regimes in place.' 6 Determining the best approach to
competition regulation in this myriad of young regimes is no easy task.
Newcomers to the antitrust arena can either follow the footsteps of
established jurisdictions, or they can create their own antitrust model.

Press Release, European Commission, Commission Introduces New
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The results are usually a combination of both imitation and originality.
Since they lack enforcement experience, they inevitably take into
consideration the practice of established, effective antitrust systems
for inspiration. New regimes thus widely use the laws of the United
States and European Union as models and also draw on standards
developed by international organizations, such as the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Model Law.170
Scholars have considered the merits of modeling new competition
laws on the experience in other jurisdictions, paying particular
attention to developing countries.' 71 Certain practical problems have
been identified, and, according to Dina Waked, there is little general
evidence of the efficacy of copying established antitrust laws. 172 The
main issue is that, when "copy-and-paste laws are not tailored to meet
local needs, their enforcement is often quite ineffective."17 3 Indeed,
Eleanor Fox and Michal Gal have highlighted the limitations of
antitrust-law transplants and warned that such transplants may even
be harmful if the special characteristics of each jurisdiction are not
considered.1 74
These cautioning remarks, however, do not rule out the value of
using the experience of other jurisdictions in the development of new
antitrust regimes. On the contrary, the adoption of laws that safeguard
competition is even more fundamental in jurisdictions "that have
persistently supported monopolistic structures and blocked the
economic opportunities of thet mass of people without power or
connections." 175 Legislation that protects the operation of markets in
such jurisdictions should contribute to enhancing efficiency and overall
social welfare.' 76
The overwhelming majority of the problems that arise when
replicating experienced antitrust rules and policies are, however,
related to contextual oversights. As a consequence, they can be
resolved by adopting a "think global, act local" approach to the
enactment and implementation of antitrust laws. This approach would
involve using the principles and experience developed in other
jurisdictions as a starting point but adapting the interpretation and
implementation of the law to each particular setting. The marked

170.
Fox & Gal, supra note 19, at 9.
171.
The new competition laws of developing countries have been excellently
explored in ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAw (Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015); COMPETITION LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013).
172.
Dina I. Waked, Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries:Reasons for
Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using Resource-BasedEvidence 3 (5th Ann. Conf. on
Empirical Legal Stud., Working Paper, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=16388740 [https://perma.cc/HZ8G-699K] (archived Feb. 13, 2017).
173.
Borrell et al., supra note 37, at 109.
174.
Fox & Gal, supra note 19, at 9.
175.
Id. at 3.
176.
Id.
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variations that exist between substantive, procedural, and
institutional aspects across jurisdictions, and even with regard to the
goals pursued by the law, are perhaps indicators that the think global,
act local approach is indeed followed, and that context is carefully
considered when adjusting competition law principles developed in
other parts of the world to new jurisdictions.
There is thus significant value in the experience of the United
States and European Union in the development of the laws and policies
of young antitrust systems, if this experience is tailored to fit the needs
of each specific environment. The adoption of leniency policies is, in
this regard, no more than the inclusion in the arsenal of the enforcer
of a type of tool that has proven to be effective at tackling collusion
within the most veteran antitrust agencies. Whether or not it is as
successful in new regimes will depend, as demonstrated in Part II of
this Article, on the specifies of the instrument that has been devised,
the skills of the hands that employ it, and the availability of.
supplementary tools that can be used in conjunction with it.1 77
B. The Adoption of Leniency in a New Jurisdiction:The Case of Hong
Kong
In order to assess the appropriateness of leniency programs in new
antitrust regimes, it is necessary to specifically explore the kind of
policies introduced and how they are being implemented. Hong Kong,
one of the latest jurisdictions to succumb to the global antitrust trend,
provides a remarkable example in this regard. The Hong Kong
Competition Ordinance (HKCO), 178 the region's first cross-sector
competition law, came into force on December 14, 2015. The HKCO was
passed in 2012 by the Legislative Council (LegCo) after two decades of
heated adoption discussions. It has taken 3.5 years for the law to be
wholly operational. During the lengthy implementation process, the
institutional framework for the application of the law was established
with the creation of the Hong Kong Competition Commission (HKCC)
and the Hong Kong Competition Tribunal (HKCT). By July 2015, the
HKCC had already adopted six guidelines on substantive and
procedural aspects of the law. Importantly, in November 2015, with
less than a month to go before the full implementation of the law, the
HKCC published two policy documents, one of which was its detailed
Leniency Policy for Undertakings Involved in Cartel Conduct (HK
Leniency Policy)"179
The reason why Hong Kong provides such an interesting case

177.
178.
HKCO].

See supra Part II.
Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619, 7, § 12 (L.H.K.) [hereinafter

179.

H.K. COMPETITION COMM'N, LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED

IN CARTEL CONDUCT (2015) [hereinafter HK Leniency Policy].
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study in the context of leniency is fourfold. First, Hong Kong's belated
competition legislation is unmistakably modeled on experienced
antitrust regimes, most prominently the European Union. Its study
therefore facilitates the assessment of the adaptation of general
competition law principles to new contexts. Second, although there was
some sectoral competition legislation in the telecommunications and
broadcasting sectors before the introduction of the HKCO, the
antitrust provisions of these sector-specific ordinances were rarely
applied and there was a manifest absence of a cartel-breaking
tradition. Third, its strategic location in Asia is paramount. Asia has
been described as a "cartel tiger" in the making, 18o with visible
progress in anti-cartel enforcement over the last decade. 18 1 Finally, the
HKCC was exceptionally quick to implement a full leniency policy, and
it adopted an overwhelmingly orthodox program built quite obviously
on international leniency experience. 182
1. Leniency in the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance
Sections 80 and 81 of the HKCO respectively allow the HKCC to
offer and to terminate leniency agreements. The law appears to cast a
wide net on the subjects of such arrangements, and the term person
could include natural persons, corporations, or partners in a
partnership. 183 However, as explained below, the Leniency Policy
enacted by the HKCC appears to restrict the application of leniency to
entities other than an undertaking. 184 If leniency is agreed on, then the
HKCC ceases attempts to bring "proceedings under Part 6 [before the
Competition Tribunal] for a pecuniary penalty in respect of an alleged
contravention of a conduct rule" for as long as the arrangement is in
place.1 5 The HKCC may terminate the agreement via a written notice
if any of the circumstances listed in Section 81 occur. These include,
inter alia, suspecting that the information provided is "incomplete,
false or misleading" or discovering that the informant has "failed to
comply" with the terms of the leniency agreement.1 86
On the basis of Sections 80 and 81 of the HKCO, the HKCC
prepared its detailed Leniency Policy. Compared to the United States
and the European Union, who adopted their first policies towards self-

180.
See Connor, supra note 79, at 17 (noting Korea is the principal example of
this trend, stating that "Asia (mostly Korea) is becoming a cartel tiger").
181.
See id. at 23 (depicting growth in anti-cartel enforcement through a graph).
182.
This is in stark contrast with China, for instance. Although leniency was
already envisaged in the AML, its original conception was not conventional, with
features such as leniency for non-cartel agreements. Detailed draft guidelines were
published in early 2016, which look set to bring the policy in line with more conventional
programs.
HKCO, supranote 178, § 80.
183.
See infra subsection IV.B.3.
184.
HKCO, supranote 178, § 80.
185.
186.
Id. § 81.
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reporters decades after the entry into force of their antitrust laws, in
Hong Kong the HKCC acted quickly to ensure that leniency was in
place the moment the HKCO became fully effective.
2. The Context: Is Hong Kong Prone to Cartels?
A discussion of the competition problems of Hong Kong is
complicated by the fact that, to date, there have been no conclusive
investigations of potential cartelization practices. There were no
important developments on this front under the sector-specific
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Ordinance18 7 or the
Broadcasting Ordinance 188 -the only antitrust regulations that
existed before the HKCO.
One of the most prominent features of Hong Kong's economy is the
presence of tycoons.1 89 A handful of families rule entire industries and
expand their power by penetrating multiple markets. A glaring
example of this is the real estate market, controlled by CK Hutchinson
Holdings, which is owned by Li Ka-Shing (Hong Kong's richest
individual), 19 0 and Henderson Land Development, which is owned by
Lee Shau-Kee (Hong Kong's second richest individual). 191 Their
holdings also control the principal companies in telecommunications,
energy, and retail, including supermarkets and pharmacies. 192 As a
consequence, several concentrated, duopolistic market structures exist
and complaints evidence occurrences of potentially abusive conduct.
Enquiries suggest that the public expects the HKCC to focus on
targeting the behavior of these local tycoons.1 93 However, thus far, the
Commission appears to be devoting more time and energy to fighting
collusion, in part because "[c]artel conduct presents an attractive
target for initial enforcement by the newly formed Competition
Commission

as

the

law

is

relatively

clear .

.

. and

successful

prosecution does not require complex economic analysis and invocation
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Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, §§ 7K, 7L (H.K.).
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Broadcasting Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 562, §§ 13-14 (H.K.).
189.
Mark Williams, Seeds of its Own Destruction: Hong Kong's Dysfunctional
Competition Policy, 2006 J. Bus. L. 52-73.
190.
See Hong Kong's 50 Richest People: #1 Li Ka-Shing, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/profile/li-ka-shing/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8NPK-DERJ]
(archived Feb. 14, 2017).
191.
See Hong Kong's 50 Richest People: #2 Lee Shau Kee, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/profile/lee-shau-kee/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N3ET6W2F] (archived Feb. 14, 2017).
192.
Jennifer Hughes, Hong Kong's Tycoons Look to Shake Off a Tough Year, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f6d20e0-8989-11e4-ad5b-00144feabdcO
.html#axzz4GAFROeoa (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/2Y6N-9S2A] (archived
Mar. 28, 2017).
193.
Thomas Cheng, Trade Associations and Cartel Conduct under the New Hong
Kong Competition Law Regime-An Enforcement Priority for the Competition
Commission?, in CARTELS IN ASIA: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 80, at 295.
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of sophisticated economic theories."1 94 And while cartels may not be
the public's main concern, there are indications that collusion is
affecting multiple local markets. Trade associations, for instance, have
oftentimes publicly called for their members to raise prices through
public announcement in the press and social media. 195 At the same
time, local courts have not been particularly damning of collusion. 196
Markets prone to cartels display special characteristics which are
not infrequent in Hong Kong.19 7 In the absence of competition law,
colluding rather than competing would seem like an attractive
business prospect. To date, the HKCC's actions against cartels have
included the following: a preliminary investigation into the residential
building and renovation maintenance market, which concluded with a
report suggesting that bid-rigging practices were likely in place;' 9 8 a
request to the Hong Kong Newspaper Hawker Association to withdraw
a letter sent to its members and a public post on Facebook suggesting
a retail price for cigarettes of certain brands;1 99 a call to rectify the
codes of conduct of the Hong Kong Institute of Architects and the Hong
Kong Institute of Planners to remove all restrictions on the freedom of
the associations' members to set their own fees and take on clients; 200
and an investigation into the alleged bid-rigging practices of five
information society companies, which has culminated with the first
ever proceedings brought by the HKCC before the HKCT. 201 Whether
any leniency applications have been filed in these or other

194.
Id.
195.
See Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm'n: Competition Commission
Welcomes Quick Rectification by the Hong Kong Newspaper Hawker Association on
Retail Price of Branded Cigarettes (May 31, 2016) [hereinafter HKCC: Competition
Commission], https://www.compcomm.hk/enlabout/public notices/files/HKNHA_20160531
.e.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3SG-LGST] (archived Feb. 14, 2017).
196.
See HKSAR v. Chan Wai Yip and Others, [2008] H.K.C. 449,
https://www.hongkongcaselaw.com/tag/magistracy-appeal-no-449-of-2008/page/2/ [https://
perma.cclY3X3-Z53F] (archived Feb. 14, 2017) (effectively ruling that bid-rigging was
lawful).
197.
See Marc Ivaldi et al., The Economics of Tacit Collusion (IDEI, Toulouse,
Working Paper No. 186, 2003), http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/tacit
collusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TXH-XUBL] (archived Feb. 14, 2017) (describing the
characteristics of markets prone to collusion).
198.
MARKET
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FOR RESIDENTIAL BUILDING RENOVATION AND MAINTENANCE
(2016),

https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/Reportonmarket-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9TT-DAYH] (archived Feb. 25, 2017).
199.
HKCC: Competition Commission, supra note 195.
200.
See Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm'n: Competition Commission
Calls Upon Two Professional Associations to Rectify Practices Which Raise Competition
Concerns (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/20161128
Competition Commissioncallsuponjtwoprofessional associationsEN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X3BN-RY5K] (archived Apr. 1, 2017).
201.
See Press Release, H.K. Competition Comm'n: Competition Takes BidRigging Case to Competition Tribunal (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/
media/press/files/20170323_CompetitionCommissiontakesbidrigging-case-toCom
petitionTribunal-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK8B-7A2S] (archived Apr. 1, 2017).
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investigations is not known at the time of writing. What is apparent,
however, is that the HKCC is attempting to hit cartels in a relatively
unusual way, by monitoring markets to detect potential infringements,
rather than relying on leniency applications or complaints. Finding
conclusive evidence of the existence of collusion is not easy via this
method.20 2 The likely intention behind this tactic may be to create a
strong fear of detection on potential cartelists in these industries, thus
creating the natural incentive for firms to blow the whistle.
3. The Scope of the Hong Kong Leniency Policy
As is traditional in competition regimes, leniency applies only in
the presence of cartel conduct that contravenes the HKCO's First
Conduct Rule (FCR), 203 which is a prohibition of anticompetitive joint
conduct that clearly echoes that of Article 101(1) of the TFEU.
Leniency might also be used on "other anti-competitive practices that.
may contravene the First Conduct Rule [that are] used to give effect to
the cartel conduct." 204 Moreover, the HKCC leaves the door open for
extending the policy to non-cartel conduct contrary to the HKCO, as
the Leniency Policy explicitly states that the possibility of entering into
a leniency agreement with respect to a contravention outside its scope
is not precluded.20 5 Although leniency outside cartel investigations is
not at all common, it is available-if rarely used-in some
jurisdictions, such as China. 206
Cartels are defined by the HKCC as "agreements between
competitors to fix prices, to share markets, to restrict output or to rig
bids." 207 Interestingly, when defining cartels, Section 2.4 of the
Leniency Policy expressly refers to both agreements and concerted
practices, but not to decisions by associations of undertakings. It is
unclear why these are not mentioned. Such practices are deemed
"serious anti-competitive conduct" under the HKCO 208 and are
contrary to the FCR. According to the Guidelines on the FRC, they are
anticompetitive by object 209 and, therefore, there will be no need to
demonstrate the existence of anti-competitive effects. 210 Efficiency
considerations under Schedule 1 of the HKCO are described as

Wils, The Use of Leniency, supra note 71.
202.
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, 1 2.3.
203.
Id. 1 2.5.
204.
205.
Id. at 1.
However, the new draft guidelines published in April 2016 suggest that
206.
leniency might be limited to cartel cases in a not too distant future.
207.

H.K. COMPETITION COMM'N, GUIDELINE: FIRST CONDUCT RULE 15,

1

3.7 (July

27, 2015) [hereinafter Guideline FCR], https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation-guidance/
guidance/first conduct rule/files/Guideline The-FirstConductRule Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B8WX-AML8] (archived Feb. 14, 2017).
HKCO, supra note 178, § 2.
208.
Guideline FCR, supra note 207, ¶ 3.7.
209.
210.
Id. 1 3.5.
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"unlikely," 2 11 and the exclusion of agreements of lesser significance
(somewhat similar to the European Union's De Minimis approach) is
expressly ruled out in the case of serious anticompetitive conduct.212
The very title of the policy document enacted by the HKCC
suggests that only undertakings may benefit from leniency in the
conditions fleshed out in the Leniency Policy. This does not mean,
however, that natural or legal persons other than undertakings cannot
resort to leniency under any circumstances. In the introduction, it is
made clear that the conditions of the Leniency Policy "[do] not apply to
leniency agreements between the Commission and persons who are not
undertakings"; yet, the HKCC may "exercise its enforcement discretion
towards such persons." In addition, the benefit of leniency extends to
current (and, under certain circumstances, even former) employees
and officers of undertakings that are granted leniency, as long as they
"provide complete, truthful and continuous cooperation with the
Commission throughout its investigation and any ensuing
proceedings." 213 This is important given that the HKCO contains not
only corporate but also individual sanctions, including director
disqualification. Avoiding these penalties is likely to act as a crucial
incentive for full cooperation.
4. The Extent and Conditions of Leniency
When leniency is granted, the HKCC agrees
not to commence proceedings for a pecuniary penalty against the cartel member
who enters into a leniency agreement with the Commission. In addition, the
Commission will agree not to bring any other proceedings before the Tribunal or
other courts other than proceedings for an order under section 94 of the
Ordinance declaring that the cartel member has contravened the First Conduct
Rule.214

The cartelist benefitting from leniency will thus be spared a fine
of up to 10 percent of the company's Hong Kong turnover for each year
of infringement, up to a maximum of three years. 215 Compared to the
corporate financial penalties that may be imposed in other
jurisdictions, those provided for in the HKCO seem rather modest. In
the European Union, for instance, fines can be up to 10 percent of
global turnover, and there is no limit on the number of years to which
that is applied. Importantly however, leniency also affects director
disqualification orders, as the HKCC vows not to seek the same when
leniency has been granted. 2 16

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. ¶ 4.4.
Id. ¶ 5.2.
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, at 1.
Id. § 1.3.
HKCO, supranote 178, § 93.
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, at 9 n.11.
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Going back to the carrot-and-stick approach described in Part
II, 2 17 the availability of reduced financial penalties creates a question
of whether, under Hong Kong competition law, the stick is strong
enough for the carrot to seem sufficiently enticing. Moreover, as in the
United States and the European Union, leniency does not extend to
civil damages claims stemming from follow-on actions before the
Tribunal. 21s Legal practitioners have noted that "[a] successful
leniency application may, in fact, expose the applicant to follow-on
actions," 219 further obscuring the advantages of self-reporting under
Hong Kong law. Furthermore, the policy gives the HKCC considerable
discretion to terminate the leniency agreement. 220 While the threat of
termination (and therefore of losing immunity) may have a positive
impact on compliance with the leniency agreement, this approach also
causes a considerable degree of legal uncertainty for applicants, which
could translate into a fear of self-reporting.
Similar to the U.S. system, the Hong Kong system grants only the
first applicant leniency, in the form of full immunity from fines. 2 21
There are no reductions in the penalties for cartelists who come in
second in the race to report. Still, some benefits are afforded to those
who do not qualify for full immunity but who are nonetheless willing
to cooperate with the investigation. 222 Such cooperation will be at the
undertaking's "own cost,"

223

and its value will be assessed according to

the parameters laid down in section 4.4 of the HK Leniency Policy. The
parameters include "approach[ing] the Commission in a timely manner
seeking to cooperate" and providing "significant evidence regarding the
cartel conduct." 224 The favorable treatment may consist of "a lower
level of enforcement action, including recommending to the Tribunal a
reduced pecuniary penalty," and making joint submissions to the
225
Tribunal on the penalties to be imposed or the orders to be made.
The Tribunal can disregard the Commission's recommendations, and,
even when it does take them into account, there is no clear guidance as
226
to how it will impact the sanctions imposed.
With regard to confidentiality, section 5 of the HK Leniency Policy
focuses on the duties of the informant seeking leniency and on the
obligations of the HKCC vis-a-vis the whistleblower. It develops the

217.
218.
219.

See supra Section II.C.
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, ¶1.7.
Neil Carabine et al., Hong Kong Competition Commission's Enforcement and

Leniency Policies, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.kwm.com/en/
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[https://perma.cc/6VBL-VUZM] (archived Feb. 14, 2017).
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, § 3.
220.
221.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. § 4.1.
224.
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Id. § 4.2.
226.
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general confidentiality requirements of section 125 of the HKCO.
According to the HKCC, the applicant is obliged to "keep confidential
the fact of the investigation, its application for leniency .

.

. and the

terms of any leniency agreement entered into with the Commission." 227
Importantly, although the policy refers to the Commission's own
obligation "to preserve the confidentiality of any confidential
information," 228 the possibility of releasing the whistleblowers' selfincriminating leniency materials to other antitrust authorities and
injured parties is not only not ruled out, but is actually presented as a
possibility. In line with section 126 of the HKCO, the Leniency Policy
states that the HKCC "may disclose confidential information with
lawful authority," 229 even if it pledges to use its "best endeavors" to
protect confidential information and the leniency agreement. 230
No details are given as to the circumstances under which the
information may be revealed. The reader is instead referred to the
specifications made in the HKCC's Guideline on Investigations.2 3 1 Yet
section 6 of this Guideline does not provide much clarity. It simply says
that disclosure may happen "without the consent of relevant parties"
and under circumstances not limited to those expressly listed in the
Ordinance. 232 It goes on to list several circumstances under which the
information may be disclosed, including the following: where necessary
for the performance of the Commission's functions, under court order,
and in cooperation with other competition 'authorities. 233 The last
scenario might seriously jeopardize the cartelists' willingness to come
forward, as it could facilitate the imposition of tough penalties and the
pursuit of injury claims in other jurisdictions.
5. The Application Process
There are various stages in the application process for leniency.
To begin with, the HK Leniency Policy establishes a marker system.
The applicant or its legal representative can inquire, without revealing
its identity, whether there is a marker available for a particular cartel.
However, applications themselves cannot be made anonymously. 234 To
be granted a marker, the information provided must be at least
"sufficient .

.

. to identify the conduct" and should include "the identity

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. § 5.1.
Id. § 5.5.
Id.
HK Leniency Policy, supranote 179,
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5.5 (citing H.K. COMPETITION COMM'N, GUIDELINE ON INVESTIGATIONS

(July 27, 2015), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation-guidance/guidance/investigations/
files/GuidelineInvestigationsEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/82SG-3ETS] (archived Feb. 4,
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232.
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233.
Id. T¶ 6.9-16.
234.
HK Leniency Policy, supra note 179, T 2.7.
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of the undertaking applying for the marker, information on the nature
of the cartel . . . the main participants . . . and the caller's contact
details." 235 This part of the application takes place over the
telephone. 236 Once a marker has been granted, the Commission will
decide whether leniency is available. Even if an investigation is
underway, and the HKCC has already exercised its investigatory
powers, leniency is not precluded. If the Commission decides that
leniency is allowable, the undertaking with the highest-ranking
marker will then be invited to submit a full application. 237 Other
applicants will also be notified that they were not the first to come
forward and will be invited to consider cooperating in hopes of more
benevolent treatment if sanctions are finally imposed. 238
Once an undertaking has been invited to apply for leniency, it
must make its application though a proffer, providing a "detailed
description of the cartel, the entities involved, the role of the applicant,
a timeline of the conduct and the evidence the leniency applicant can
provide in respect of the cartel conduct." 239 The proffer may be made
orally or in writing. 240 When the HKCC has considered the information
provided in the proffer, and any other additional information, if it is
assured of "full and truthful cooperation" it will decide "whether to
241
make an offer to enter into a leniency agreement."
The leniency agreement is drafted according to the template
included in Annex A of the Leniency Policy. Applicants are effectively
required to sign a written confession, admitting their involvement in
cartel conduct. 242 This formality, which might be of concern to
in light of the ambiguous
potential informants-particularly
in part a
confidentiality guarantees described above 243 -is
consequence of the semi-judicial enforcement system of this
jurisdiction. Whereas the European Commission is simultaneously the
authority that handles leniency applications and the body that imposes
fines for anticompetitive conduct, in Hong Kong it is the Competition
Tribunal that decides on the application of penalties. Therefore, the
HKCC requires a signed confession on the basis of which it endeavors
to request that the Tribunal not punish the informant. Once the
agreement is finalized, the grantee is obliged to "provide the
Commission with all non-privileged information and evidence in

235.
Id. 1 2.8.
236.
Id. ¶ 2.11.
237.
Id. 1 2.12, 2.14.
238.
Id. 1 2.17, 4.2.
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See id. 1 2.3 ("The Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel
243.
Conduct applies only to cartel conduct in contravention of the First Conduct Rule.").
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respect of the cartel conduct without delay." 244 Any breach of the
agreement could lead to the termination of the agreement on the part
of the HKCC, which has the right to revoke leniency under section 81
of the HKCO. 245
V. LENIENCY PROGRAMS IN NEW ANTITRUST JURISDICTIONS:
AN ASSESSMENT

This Article has carefully explored the international principles of
leniency in antitrust, the experiences of the United States and the
European Union, and the specific application of leniency in Hong Kong,
one of the newest leniency policies in the world. It is now possible to
conduct an assessment of how the traditional challenges of leniency
manifest in young antitrust regimes and the ways in which such
obstacles may be addressed. Part II established, with the support of an
extensive literature review, that leniency may effectively deter cartel
activity. However, the research also revealed that its eventual success
would be dependent on internal policy design and the availability of
support from external (antitrust and non-antitrust) law and policy
instruments. 246 The principal external and internal hurdles affecting
new leniency programs are explored in this Part.
A. Are the Rewards Offered to Informants Sufficiently High?
The recompense offered to cartel informants in Hong Kong is
limited by a feature present in most leniency programs, new and old:
the absence of positive rewards. The availability of full immunity,
covering both fines and other penalties, is available. However, as the
U.S. experience reveals, the first leniency applications may not be filed
for some time, as cartelists will want to wait and see how others are
treated to ensure that the HKCC will honor its leniency promise. 247
Whereas positive rewards are also lacking in the E.U. and U.S.
regimes, in new jurisdictions this absence may be more problematic.
As seen is Part II, the incentive of leniency is unavoidably modulated
by the punishment that may be escaped by resorting to it. 2 4 8 Regimes

that only contemplate limited financial penalties, such as the ones
available under the HKCO, call into question the attractiveness of the
"carrot." These low fines, coupled with the fact that, in young regimes,
cartels tend to be entrenched in local culture 249 and that there is more

244.
Id. 1 2.27.
245.
Id. 1 2.30.
246.
See supra subsections II.C.1-2.
247.
See supra Section III.A.
248.
Spagnolo, Divide et Impera, supra note 23, at 4-5.
249.
Bryane Michael, Hong Kong Needs a Whistle-blower Law for Better
Governance and Business Practices, Researcher Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/newsfhong-kong/law-crime/article/1848274/hong-
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fear of potential reprisal against those who report, 250 indicate that it
may well take time and effort for leniency programs to bear fruit where
there is no supplementary incentive of positive rewards.
B. Prize for Second Best
Leniency in new regimes tends to be limited to the first to report.
As previously discussed, the decision to restrict leniency to the first
applicant is backed by the findings of numerous scholars on both
efficiency and retributive justice grounds. Yet, the uncertainty of not
being first could make the cost-benefit analysis intrinsic to the decision
to apply for leniency less appealing. In Hong Kong, this is addressed
by allowing for the possibility of affording more beneficial treatment to
companies who do not qualify for leniency but do offer their cooperation
on an ad hoc basis (similar to plea agreements into which the DOJ
might enter). 25 1 This approach constitutes an obstacle to predictability,
but this is expected and almost unavoidable in regimes with little or
no enforcement practice. With time, the case-by-case application of the
policy will reveal just how that discretion is exercised.
C. Low FinancialPenalties and Damages: Too Severe a Stick?
Another fundamental question relating to leniency is whether,
given the lack of protection from follow-on damages claims, leniency is
even attractive to the first candidate under a new antitrust regime.
Where fines are not particularly high, the biggest risk of getting caught
might be private actions. In the Sotheby's-Christie's cartel discussed
earlier, 252 the fine imposed on Sotheby's was $45 million, but damages
amounted to $256 million, which would have left the company
bankrupt had it not been for its former CEO paying part of this sum
out of his own pocket. And, in the E.U. context, a 2014 leniency
beneficiary, Lufthansa, was sued for C1.76 billion by Deutsche Bahn
for the damages suffered as a consequence of the former's participation
in an air freight cartel. 253 To make matters worse, the duty to
cooperate in the investigation bears elevated legal and administrative
fees, which are not covered by leniency.

kong-needs-whistle-blower-law-better-governance-and [https://perma.cc/CKH5-UFP4]
(archived Feb. 4, 2017).
Johan Nylander, Why Hong Kong Needs a Whistleblowing Policy, FORBES
250.
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jnylander/2015/08/14/why-hong-kongneeds-a-whistleblowing-policy/#218c460f71f5) [https://perma.cc/F6E6-CX79] (archived
Feb. 14, 2017).
See supra subsection III.A.C.
251.
See supra Section III.B.
252.
253.
Deutsche Bahn Sues Airlines Over Price-fixing, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 12,
2014), http://www.dw.com/en/deutsche-bahn-sues-airlines-over-price-fixing/a-18103348
[https://perma.cc/B7M8-EYPP] (archived Feb. 7, 2017). The case was eventually settled
out of court.
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In principle, low penalties and high damages are not an advisable
combination for the proper-functioning of leniency. However, the
practical impact of these features will be determined by the specific
characteristics of cartels and cartelists in each jurisdiction. In Hong
Kong, for instance, one mitigating factor for the problems associated
with the relatively modest fines vis-a-vis the substantial costs of
reporting is that over 98 percent of businesses in Hong Kong are smallor medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 254 If they are engaged in cartels,
fines on local turnover would have a much more significant impact on
them than they would on larger, multinational corporations that
operate in other areas of the world.
This leads to an important inference regarding the purpose and
utility of new leniency programs: while their role in the crackdown on
international cartels might be secondary and complementary to that of
experienced leniency policies, they may still be very efficient at
tackling local collusion, which is just as detrimental to the proper
functioning of their home markets. And these regimes' peripheral
responsibility in bringing down international cartels should not be
underestimated. The existence of effective cartel detection tools in
multiple jurisdictions increases the overall possibility of breaking up
cartels; it also increases the cost of collusion once a cartel is busted.
This ought to create a powerful joint deterrent effect, as it will be more
difficult for international cartelists to offset the costs of the penalties
they may face in one jurisdiction with the profits made in other parts
of the world. As a result, these separate, jurisdiction-specific efforts
could end up providing a "glocalized" solution to international
collusion, arguably the most harmful kind of anticompetitive behavior.
With regard to injured parties, it is also important to emphasize
that the extent to which restitution may be achieved will largely
depend on how damages are awarded in each jurisdiction. This, once
again, can only be determined through experience.
D. Enhancing Cartel Detection Risk through Non-Leniency Tools
In jurisdictions where there have been few or no finalized cartel
investigations, there is no information currently available that could
help calculate the detection rate of collusion. Unavoidably, the risk of
detection that might convince a company to apply for leniency is very
difficult to measure. As in other young antitrust regimes, in Hong
Kong, until the recent introduction of the HKCO, the chances of getting
away with collusion were 100 percent, as the conduct was not illegal.
This makes it even more difficult to push companies to come forward
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simply by introducing the possibility of obtaining immunity from
penalties that, for the time being, are no more than a threat on paper.
The initiative of the HKCC to monitor markets and conduct studies in
sectors where collusion is likely to occur is commendable in this
regard. 255 The HKCC's efforts reflect an attempt to raise awareness
among the business community that the activity is now illegal, that
investigations are underway, and that the risk of detection exists.
Obfuscating cost-benefit analyses regarding the profitability of
reporting as opposed to staying in the cartel, while creating a
perception of risk, is paramount for the invigoration of the policy.

256

Such techniques are advisable, wherever possible, in young antitrust
jurisdictions.
E. The Boundaries of Agency Discretion
This analysis of the HK Leniency Policy illustrates the degree to
which enforcement discretion might jeopardize the attainment of
transparency and predictability in new leniency programs. Enforcers
are afforded discretion both in the conclusion and in the termination of
leniency agreements. In the negotiation stage, for instance, a marker
can only be granted if the Commission determines that the information
provided is "sufficient."2 57 It is unclear what will constitute, in the eyes
of the HKCC, sufficient information. Moreover, participants who
"coerced" others to join the cartel will not qualify for leniency, 258 but
the actions that are considered coercion are not detailed.
The Hong Kong Competition Association riticized this ambiguity
in its submissions on the draft leniency policy and asked the HKCC to
come up with a precise set of criteria similar to that available in the
United Kingdom. 259 As for termination, there is little clarity as to the
circumstances under which the HKCC might decide to end an existing
leniency agreement after it has been entered into. For instance, it may
be revoked if there are "reasonable grounds to suspect that the
information on which it based its decision to make the agreement was
incomplete, false or misleading. .. ."26o The term "reasonable grounds"
in this context grants the HKCC very broad powers, at the expense of
predictability and transparency. While unnecessary discretion and
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uncertainty should be avoided, such vagueness is not uncommon at
this introductory stage. Practice should progressively contribute
towards providing greater clarity.
F. The Protectionof Confidentiality: The Boundariesof Transparency
and Predictability
Requiring a written confession will be of concern for leniency
applicants, given the broadly construed scenarios under which
disclosure of confidential information may take place. As of this
moment, it is unclear just how likely disclosure will be in practice.
Uncertainty on this controversial issue is not uncommon, even in
experienced regimes. In the European Union, the Court of Justice in
Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt avoided providing clarification on the
issue, and left it up to the national courts to conduct a "weighing
exercise" of the interests in favor of disclosure versus the protection of
confidentiality
on a
case-by-case
basis. 261 Subsequently,
Bundeswettbewerbsbehorde v. Donau Chemie AG reiterated the
inadequacy of rigid rules. 262 With regard to leniency documents, the

Court established that, while a refusal to grant access to the same
could well be justified, such access ought not to be "systematically
refused." 263 Requests should be "assessed on a case-by-case basis,

taking into account all the relevant factors in the case." 264 With regard

to disclosure requests from other jurisdictions, it is understandable
that the HKCC would want to leave the door open to honoring these,
so as to comply with bilateral cooperation agreements with other
jurisdictions. However, the "stick" faced by leniency applicants would
be so severe if they could be sued in other jurisdictions on the basis of
the leniency agreements entered into in Hong Kong that it could well
eliminate the entire appeal of the leniency "carrot."
Despite these criticisms, the existing uncertainty can be defended
along at least three lines. First, at a time when the law has only just
been fully implemented and only one case has been brought before the
HKCT, ambiguity is to be expected. The HKCC could not, and ought
not, close off room for interpretation in the policy document, as it would
imply an extra-limitation on its policy-drafting powers. The role of the
Competition Tribunal in the clarification of some of the pending issues
will be crucial, and the court should have room to ultimately decide
whether leniency should be granted. Second, since most of the
undertakings in Hong Kong are small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), if they do not operate internationally, there is less reason to

261.
Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, 2011 E.C.R. 1-5161.
262.
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E.C.R. 1-366.
263.
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264.
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fear that disclosure could lead to massive damages claims in other
jurisdictions. Third, uncertainty might be a goal in itself. One should
not forget that leniency applicants are outlaws, engaged in an activity
that is highly detrimental to competition and economic efficiency.
Antitrust fining policies, for instance, oftentimes expressly aim to
make it difficult for firms to calculate the amount they might be fined,
so as to avoid risk-benefit analyses. As the Court of Justice once said,
"[i]f the amount of the fine were the result of a calculation which
followed a simple arithmetical formula, undertakings would be able to
predict the possible penalty and to compare it with the profit that they
would derive from the infringement of the competition rules." 265
Therefore, while transparency may be desirable, predictability is best
avoided in situations with such a low detection probability and such
266
high profits for breaking the law.

VI. CONCLUSION

While the antitrust trendsetters have principally molded their
legislation into shape through a history of trial-and-error, antitrust
trend followers are able take advantage of the catalog of good (and bad)
antitrust practices that they have at their disposal because of the
experience of established jurisdictions. Leniency policies constitute a
vital part of that catalog. They can act as successful weapons of mass
cartel dissuasion where there are established effects on both detection
and deterrence of conduct that would otherwise be very difficult to
uncover. At the same time, insofar as they may lead to the imposition
of heavy financial penalties, leniency policies result in an increase in
the financial resources of antitrust authorities that is very enticing for
newly established competition agencies. It comes as no surprise then
that leniency is a tool that young regimes crave and are implementing
at a rapid pace.
The prompt adoption of amnesty programs is commendable and
generally beneficial for the protection of competition. While cartels
may become unstable and die on their own, the principal cause of death
remains vigorous antitrust enforcement,26 7 of which leniency is a vital
component. Efficient policy design is a challenge in every situation, but
particularly in jurisdictions with a limited competition culture.
Borrowing from international experience helps these new jurisdictions
to cut corners and to achieve admirable results at a faster pace, but
young antitrust regimes exhibit specific problems that must be taken

Case T-53/03, BPB plc v. Commission 2008 E.C.R. 11-254.
265.
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266.
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267.
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into account in the design and application of each individual leniency
program.
In particular, this Article makes three principal proposals. First,
there is a strong argument to be made for the introduction of positive
rewards for leniency applicants. They could increase the incentive to
cooperate, offset the effect of substantial follow-on damages claims, and
enhance the attractiveness of leniency in regimes that do not envisage
particularly stiff penalties against collusion. Second, while
transparency and predictability remain essential, some uncertainty is
unavoidable at the early enforcement stage, and possibly even
desirable. The principal value of leniency resides in its creation of a
general (unmeasurable) perception of risk; the effects of full
predictability on that perception would be at best mixed, particularly
in jurisdictions where cartel detection probability has been virtually
zero. Third, guaranteeing the confidentiality of leniency applications is
a must, albeit within the inescapable practical limitations of such an
endeavor. Agencies are encouraged to avoid the kind of ambiguity that
could frighten potential leniency applicants, yet some of the remaining
loose ends are best tied through experience. As Ann O'Brien notes,
transparency is "a journey, not a destination," something to strive
towards in daily decision making that requires the passage of time. 268
These proposals are by no means a panacea for all ills. Leniency
should be viewed as an investigatory instrument in the hands of the
enforcer as part of a greater strategy to bring down cartels. To ensure
its maximum potential, it requires the support of the general antitrust
apparatus it helps to enforce. This support comes in the form of nonleniency investigative tools, such as market studies similar to those
conducted by the HKCC, or wider reporting strategies such as the EU's
Anonymous Whistleblower Tool. But, most importantly, shortcomings
within the design of antitrust systems, such as weak penalties, pose a
real threat to cartel detection in general and the effectiveness of
leniency in particular. While these proposals ought to diminish the
negative impact of those limitations, the most advisable solution is to
introduce the necessary changes to the basic substantive and
procedural laws that enhance the potential of antitrust systems.
Striving towards healthy leniency policy design, as demonstrated
in the Article, has fundamental local and global implications. From a
local perspective, protecting markets from collusion is paramount to
the promotion of economic development and prosperity. From a global
point of view, when jointly considered, the multiple local pointillist
efforts to combat cartels paint a very promising picture of the future
potential to tackle international collusion. As convergence increases,
cartelists operating across jurisdictions cannot expect to continue to
take advantage of disparate antitrust standards across jurisdictions to
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ensure the profitability of their harmful behavior. Individually
considered, these budding leniency programs are undoubtedly
important, but the joint deterrent effect achieved by the propagation of
anti-cartel tools is invaluable.

